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Abstract 
  Significant technological advances over the past few decades have fueled the 
continual and rapid development of an information-based world.  Network Centric 
Warfare (NCW) has become the buzzword of the young millennium within the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and is quickly becoming a popularly shared vision and 
rallying cry for force transformation among United States military leaders.  An essential 
element in fully implementing this network-centric way of thinking is to develop useful 
measures to help gauge the effectiveness and efficiency of both our military networks and 
our strategic NCW doctrine.  The goal of this research is first to provide a comprehensive 
summary of the key literary works that have forged a foundational basis for defining 
NCW.  Second, this work will utilize a System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation 
(SEAS) combat model, which represents a Kosovo-like engagement (provided by the 
Space and Missile Center), to serve as a tool in exploring the use of NCW metrics in 
military worth analysis.  Third and last, this effort selects measures for the physical, 
information, and cognitive domains of NCW and analyzes the outputs from the Kosovo 
scenario that are pertinent to each domain in order to assess the usefulness of each metric.  
In the final analysis, the average target detection distance outputs and average 
communication channel message loading metrics chosen for the physical and information 
domains yielded mixed results and levels of utility, while the highly aggregated metric of 
target kills served as a useful, and yet rough, final metric for the cognitive domain. 
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MODELING NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE (NCW) WITH 
THE SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS SIMULATION (SEAS) 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 In the current Information Age, success or failure of operations often relies 
heavily on the ability to gather, translate, and process large amount of data and 
information.  Evidence of this phenomenon can clearly be seen within two distinct 
environments: the American business arena and the World Wide Web.  In the American 
business arena, Wal-Mart has moved from a traditional retailer to a precision retailer by 
achieving information superiority in its domain (Alberts, Gartska, and Stein, 1999:46).  
The end result of Wal-Mart’s highly network and information-focused approach to retail 
sales is that its stores reign as the nation’s top retailer, having $256 billion in annual sales 
for 2004 (Wal-Mart, 2005:2).  As for the World Wide Web, the multitude of applications 
for networking and sharing information on a global scale continue to be developed and 
applied. 
The combination of digital communications capabilities and breakthroughs in 
software technology in the form of Web browsers and servers has combined to 
enable information interactions among entities of virtually any size that can be 
connected to the Internet. The net result is referred to by some as the social-
technological phenomenon, the “Internet Tsunami”.  (Alberts, Gartska, and Stein, 
1999:250) 
 
The same principles of information dominance and power which have 
transformed the U.S. market place and linked the world via the internet apply equally to 
the United States military.  Information technology has significantly changed our 
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concepts of time and distance.  Distance is becoming less relevant as large amounts of 
information are able to be transmitted and received with increasing ease and speed.  
Within the battlespace, this shrinking of distance and time translates into increased 
combat capability and the potential for orders of magnitude increases in mission 
effectiveness and efficiency.  The key to realizing this potential is the ability to fully 
utilize our systems of sensors, data processors, communication links, and decision-
making methods. 
 A ground-breaking concept that moves the U.S. military towards the goal of 
achieving maximum combat success and efficiency through utilization of network 
technology has emerged over the last five to ten years.  This revolutionary idea is called 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW).  The defining characteristics and exact applications of 
NCW are continually evolving, as are its applications.  NCW finds itself being explored 
and studied as part of a larger initiative within the DoD, that of transformation.  A 
primary goal of transformation, and consequently of the Office of Force Transformation, 
is to keep the United States military at the forefront of warfare technology, tactics, and 
knowledge of the enemy.  The concept of effects-based operations (EBO) is being 
employed as a theoretical means to the end of military transformation.  A policy of 
“forward deterrence” has been adopted by the Office of Force Transformation and NCW 
figures to play a key role in implementing this policy. 
1.2 Problem Definition 
 The technological advances of the Information Age have not only increased 
capacities of information exchange and decreased information processing time, but have 
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also increased levels of complexity involved with sorting through data and information to 
find the packets that are pertinent to a certain decision or problem.  The higher levels of 
complexity involved in vast information networks and systems make it difficult to assess 
the relative worth and efficiency of these networks and systems.  The development of 
basic, definable, and measurable metrics is required in order to serve as diagnostic tools 
for rating the effectiveness of network performance and impact on command and control, 
especially within a military system or tactical engagement.  These measures will be 
determined and chosen based on available outputs from a combat modeling scenario.  
Once basic metrics are established, their military worth can be measured through the 
utilization of various analysis methods and tools applied to output data from multiple 
combat simulation runs.  In short, the essence of the problem for this thesis effort is to 
determine how to measure the effective application and worth of NCW within the context 
of a combat modeling simulation. 
1.3 Research Objective 
 This research has been sponsored by the Simulation and Analysis Facility 
(SIMAF) at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH.  This effort is focused on first defining Network 
Centric Warfare (NCW) from reputable research literature and doctrinal documents 
pertaining to the subject.  This definition will be formed against the back-drop of the 
larger picture of force transformation currently being employed within the Department of 
Defense.  Once defined, various modeling techniques and metrics for NCW will be 
addressed and established.  From these proposed models and metrics, a specific modeling 
option will be chosen and utilized in order to measure the military worth of NCW in a 
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well defined mission level scenario.  The focus of analysis will be primarily on 
contrasting the performance of an NCW-enabled force in a given combat situation versus 
the performance of that same force acting at degraded levels of NCW capability.  The 
outputs resulting from the baseline case and NCW degraded cases will be analyzed to 
provide insight into the benefits and challenges of utilizing NCW as an applied theory of 
conducting military operations. 
1.4 Research Scope 
 For this effort, Modeling and Simulation (M&S) will be the primary specialty 
within the Operations Research tool set that will be utilized as a means of evaluating the 
military worth and effectiveness of an NCW-enabled force.  The specific type of tool 
within M&S which will be utilized for this effort is agent-based modeling (ABM).  The 
software selected for analyzing the NCW scenario is the System Effectiveness and 
Analysis Simulation (SEAS).  The SEAS scenario will consist of generic blue and red 
combat forces, which will legitimately represent some NCW capabilities within the 
context of a mission level simulation model.  As mentioned in the Research Objective 
section above, a baseline case of this scenario will be run and compared versus modified 
configurations of the scenario which removes or degrades certain NCW capabilities.  
Based on the output from replications of this model, various statistical analysis 
techniques will be employed as tools in determining the overall value of NCW within the 
context of this thesis research. 
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1.5 Thesis Overview 
 Following this Introduction are chapters for a Literature Review, Methodology, 
Analysis, and Conclusions.  The Literature Review (Chapter 2) covers several definitions 
of NCW which have been gleaned from foundational works on the subject, as well as 
several fundamental definitions laid out by Joint and USAF doctrinal documents.  
Chapter 2 then presents a formulated definition of NCW that is uniquely crafted for this 
research effort and concludes with various possible approaches for modeling and 
measuring NCW.  The Methodology chapter (Chapter 3) describes the modeling 
approach that will be used to represent NCW within the context of a mission-level 
combat model.  Details and background of the SEAS Kosovo scenario will be provided 
here.  The Analysis chapter (Chapter 4) will provide a presentation and interpretation of 
the results from repeated runs of the combat model NCW scenario for a baseline case 
versus a case that was modified in order to determine the military worth of applying 
NCW within scenario.  The Conclusions chapter (Chapter 5) provides various bottom-
line statements derived from the modeling and analysis of this NCW research.  Also, 
recommendations for further research of NCW are offered in this chapter. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 The United States military is currently undergoing a phase of revolutionary 
change and transition.  Paradigms are shifting from a Cold War, force-on-force 
philosophy of warfare to an asymmetric, network centric approach.  The DoD’s Office of 
Force Transformation has issued a new strategy for achieving this transition.  Vital to this 
transformation effort are the concepts of Effects Based Operations (EBO) and NCW, 
which will be covered in more detail in section 2.2.  Having thus portrayed NCW as a 
key enabler of EBO and as a key means of achieving U.S. military transformation, a 
thorough exploration of current NCW definitions and a formulated definition for this 
research effort will be detailed in section 2.3.  Once defined, various approaches for 
modeling NCW will be described in section 2.4.  After a brief introduction for this 
section, an exploration of Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) as a possible tool for modeling 
NCW is presented in section 2.4.2.  A specific application of ABM, the System 
Effectiveness Analysis Simulation (SEAS), is then described as prime candidate software 
to model NCW in section 2.4.3.  Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for NCW are 
described in section 2.5, followed by a summary of this Literature Review in section 2.6. 
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2.2 Transformation, Effects Based Operations (EBO), and NCW 
 2.2.1 Transformation - The New U.S. Military Strategy 
 The current climate of the United States military as a whole is one of urgent and 
necessary change.  In a speech at The Citadel in December of 2001, President Bush 
stated: 
 The need for military transformation was clear before the conflict in Afghanistan, 
 and before September the 11th. . .  What’s different today is our sense of urgency 
- the need to build this future force while fighting a present war.  It’s like 
 overhauling an engine while you’re going at 80 miles an hour.  Yet we have no 
 other choice.  (Director, Office of Force Transformation, 2003:1) 
 
The events of 9/11 exposed vulnerabilities within the Department of Defense that are no 
longer being ignored.  As the President stated, the need for transformation of the military 
was present prior to the horrific terror attacks on the United States.  Unfortunately, as is 
the case with most human endeavors, proper motivation was necessary to provide the fuel 
for real change, which in this case is the full implementation of military transformation. 
 The current vision for transformation stated by the Department of Defense is as 
follows: 
 Military transformation will enable the U.S. Armed Forces to achieve broad and 
 sustained competitive advantage in the 21st century. It comprises those activities 
 that anticipate and create the future by coevolving concepts, processes, 
 organizations, and technologies to produce new sources of military power. The 
 transformation of our armed forces will dramatically increase our strategic and 
 operational responsiveness, speed, reach, and effectiveness, making our forces 
 increasingly precise, lethal, tailorable, agile, survivable, and more easily 
 sustainable.  (Director, Office of Force Transformation, 2003:4) 
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Essentially, transformation is the shaping and molding of our military force that seeks to 
fully exploit the advantages we currently possess and to protect against and minimize our 
vulnerabilities.  Transformation is employed and accomplished through a combination of 
concepts, capabilities, people, and technology.  The overall objective of these changes is 
to sustain the U.S. competitive advantage in warfare (Director, Office of Force 
Transformation, 2003:8). 
 An essential concept that drives transformation is the idea of forward deterrence, 
which is a stance of prevention rather than reaction.  As Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld said at the National Defense University in January of 2002, “We must promote 
a more entrepreneurial approach to developing military capabilities, one that encourages 
people, all people, to be proactive and not reactive…” (Director, Office of Force 
Transformation, 2003:29).  Although current U.S. military capabilities are superior to any 
existing conventional threat, our supremacy will rapidly diminish over time if we do not 
continue to enhance our military prowess (Director, Office of Force Transformation, 
2003:12).  There are several key components of transformation that are geared towards 
achieving forward deterrence.  Among these key components are EBO and NCW.  These 
two concepts are being explored and refined in order to understand how they complement 
one another in meeting the needs of the new security environment (Smith, 2002:xxii). 
2.2.2 EBO Fundamentals 
 Unlike network-centric operations, which have emerged from the technologies 
and thinking of the Information Age, effects-based operations are not new (Smith, 
2002:xxiii).  Military leaders and planners have always tried to plan and execute battle 
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plans and create battlefield conditions favorable to the achievement of their objectives 
and policy goals.  Rather than a new form of warfare, EBO is a way of thinking or a 
methodology for planning, executing, and assessing operations designed to attain specific 
effects that are required to achieve desired national security outcomes (Director, Office 
of Force Transformation, 2003:34). 
 
Figure 1.  EBO's Major Components (Doctrine and Education Group, 2004:8) 
 
 Figure 1 shows EBO’s three major components: effects-based planning, 
execution, and assessment (Doctrine and Education Group, 2004:8).  The central, cyclic 
flow around “ONA” in this figure represents EBO’s dependence on the continual 
function of something called Operational Net Assessment (ONA).  ONA integrates 
people, processes, and tools that use multiple information sources and collaborative 
analysis to build a common, shared, holistic knowledge base of the operational 
environment (Doctrine and Education Group, 2004:9).  ONA places primary focus on the 
operational level and prioritizes the network as the key element of effective operations. 
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 EBO is primarily about focusing knowledge, precision, speed, and agility on the 
enemy decision-makers to degrade their ability to take coherent action rather than 
conducting combat operations on more efficient destruction of the enemy (Director, 
Office of Force Transformation, 2003:34).  As will be detailed more fully in the next 
section concerning NCW, EBO is focused less on effects within the physical domain and 
more so on effects in the information and cognitive domain, with a special emphasis on 
the cognitive, or decision, arenas of warfare.  The knowledge, precision, speed, and 
agility brought about by network-centric operations provide the necessary ingredients for 
entry into the realm of EBO (Director, Office of Force Transformation, 2003:34). 
2.2.3 NCW - A Key Enabler of EBO 
 Network-centric warfare is an emerging theory of war in the Information Age.  It 
is also a concept that, at the highest level, constitutes the military’s response to the 
Information Age (Director, Office of Force Transformation, 2005:3).  In an increasingly 
information-driven world, power is progressively being drawn from the sharing of 
information, the degree of information access, and speed of information transmission and 
reception.  As an organizing principle, NCW accelerates our ability to know, decide, and 
act by linking sensors, communications systems, and weapons systems in an 
interconnected grid (Director, Office of Force Transformation, 2003:13).  NCW involves 
a modern way of organizing and thinking about the application of our military forces as 
they relate to desired outcomes and therefore is a key element of EBO. 
 A basic understanding of NCW can be obtained by examining the three domains 
of conflict: the cognitive domain, information domain, and physical domain.  There is 
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also a fourth domain, the social domain, which has been proposed and documented by the 
Office of Force Transformation as of January 2005.  However, for this thesis effort, the 
focus will be on the originally proposed three domains of NCW.  The three domains 
provide a general framework for tracing what actually goes on in the stimulus and 
response process inside human minds and human organizations (Smith, 2002:161). 
Physical actions often have a psychological impact, which is then translated into a 
decision.  The physical domain spans the traditional environments of land, sea, air, and 
space in which conflict typically occurs.  The physical domain is home to the platforms 
and communications networks of a given military force.  Typically, measures of combat 
effectiveness are easiest to measure in this domain and thus it has traditionally been the 
focus of most analysis conducted on military warfare.  However, the physical domain 
provides an incomplete picture in capturing the complex interactions and outcomes of 
real warfare.  This is the primary reason for including the information and cognitive 
domains in the conceptual framework of NCW. 
 The information domain represents the realm in which information is created, 
manipulated, and shared.  Information traces its origins to data collected from sensing 
events in the physical domain.  Comparatively, effects in the information domain can be 
more difficult to measure than those in the physical domain.  Often, usable measures of 
information are those pertaining to communication range, broadcast range, bandwidth, 
and the reliability of information (accuracy).  This domain also encompasses all of the 
means of conveying the decisions, plans, and orders that translate a cognitive response 
into physical actions (Smith, 2002:164-165).  Consequently, it is increasingly the 
information domain that must be protected and defended to enable a force to generate 
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combat power in the face of offensive actions by an adversary (Director, Office of Force 
Transformation, 2003:33). 
 The cognitive domain is the locus of the functions of perceiving, making sense of 
a situation, assessing alternatives, and deciding on a course of action (Smith, 2002:173).  
This domain exists within the mind of the warfighter.  This is the realm of EBO 
(Director, Office of Force Transformation, 2003:33).  The cognitive domain holds the 
intangible elements of knowledge, understanding, decision-making, morale, and 
leadership, just to name a few.  Measures for this domain are by far the most difficult to 
assess.  Decision analysis methods and tools, plus an evaluation of artificial intelligence 
leadership decisions made within a combat model are possible ways of capturing 
behavior in this domain. 
 
Figure 2.  Domains of Conflict (Director, Office of Force Transformation, 2003:33) 
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 Figure 2 displays more specifically how NCW relates to the three domains. 
The domain intersections represent important, dynamic areas within which concept-
focused experimentation should be conducted (Director, Office of Force Transformation, 
2003:33).  The overlap area designated Conveyed Commander’s Intent (the Shared 
Awareness region), where the information and cognitive domains intersect, is an 
extremely important realm when it comes to the final outcome of a given conflict because 
this is often the area where key decisions are made that dictate the flow of warfare.  The 
intersection of all three domains encapsulates the realm in which NCW exists.  NCW is 
the result of a dynamic interplay of elements from the physical, information, and 
cognitive domains of conflict. 
2.3 Defining NCW 
 2.3.1 Definitions from Foundational NCW Works 
 Since its conception in the late 1990’s, there has been a significant amount of 
literature published on Network Centric Warfare (NCW).  Two significant documents, 
one by Alberts (1999) and the other by Fewell (2003), provide a baseline from which to 
reference fundamental definitions of NCW.  The Department of Defense has embraced 
the term and has included the concept in its Joint Vision documents.  The Air Force’s 
Basic Doctrine also highlights basic concepts of NCW.  From this plethora of sources, 
many various definitions and characterizations of NCW will be distilled and one 
comprehensive definition will be formed. 
 13
The foundational document for NCW was written by David S. Alberts, John J. 
Gartska, and Frederick P. Stein in 1999.  In their work, Network Centric Warfare, 
Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, Alberts et al. established a baseline 
of thinking upon which the structure of NCW has been built.  Despite the excellent 
groundwork that has been laid, an exact and working definition of NCW is difficult to 
extract from this foundational text.  This difficulty is largely due to the fact that NCW is 
still a developing idea.  As Alberts said at a conference in Washington on March 28, 
2005, “An idea, like a child, takes on a life of its own. It has parents, it has supporters, it 
has detractors -- all of which had a great influence on the development of the idea. But 
ultimately the idea, like the child, becomes what it becomes” (Air Force Link, 2005).  In 
this sense, NCW is very much like a child that is still growing and developing into a 
future form that is largely unknown at the present time. 
 Despite the difficulties in finding an authoritative and accepted definition, certain 
key components of the current conceptions of NCW can be highlighted.  The Australian 
Government’s Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) compiled an 
investigative paper in 2003 that defines NCW in the following way: 
Network-centric warfare is the conduct of military operations using networked 
information systems to generate a flexible and agile military force that acts under 
a common commander’s intent, independent of the geographic or organisational 
disposition of the individual elements, and in which the focus of the warfighter is 
broadened away from the individual, unit or platform concerns to give primacy to 
the mission and responsibilities of the team, task group or coalition. (Fewell and 
Hazen, 2003:39) 
 
This same paper identifies four distinct qualities, or tenets, that are fundamental to NCW: 
1) A robustly networked force improves information sharing 
2) Information sharing and collaboration enhances the quality of information and 
shared situational awareness 
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3) Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-synchronization, 
and enhances sustainability and speed of command 
4) These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness 
(Fewell and Hazen, 2003:2) 
 
The DSTO further cites NCW as typically being expressed in terms of ‘four rights’: the 
network supplies the right information at the right time in the right form to the right 
person (Fewell and Hazen, 2003:2).  The DSTO adds a fifth ‘right’ to this list.  Not only 
does the right information need to be available to the right person at the right time in the 
right form, but also it needs to be put to the right use (Fewell and Hazen, 2003:34). 
 Alberts states that NCW is about human and organizational behavior (Alberts, 
Gartska, and Stein, 1999:88).  This is an important point because it hints at the 
difficulties in fully modeling NCW, given the significant human component and presence 
of complexity due to human decision makers and operators.  Further, Alberts states that 
NCW is not narrowly about technology, but broadly about an emerging response to the 
Information Age (Alberts, Gartska, and Stein, 1999:88).  In defining NCW, Alberts 
cautions that focusing exclusively on communications networks is a mistake and that the 
focus needs rather to be on warfare and operations.  The communications networks are 
nearly a means to an end, with the end in mind being a more efficient and effective 
conduct of warfare. 
 2.3.2 Joint and USAF Guidance on NCW 
 The two core documents for future Joint Force operations are Joint Vision 2010 
and Joint Vision 2020.  Joint Vision 2010, since it was drafted in 1997 makes no mention 
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of NCW specifically.  However, this document does comment on the importance of 
Information Superiority, as shown by this excerpt: 
Information superiority will require both offensive and defensive information 
warfare (IW). Offensive information warfare will degrade or exploit an 
adversary’s collection or use of information. It will include both traditional 
methods, such as a precision attack to destroy an adversary’s command and 
control capability, as well as nontraditional methods such as electronic intrusion 
into an information and control network to convince, confuse, or deceive enemy 
military decision makers. (DoD, 1996: 16) 
  
The last phrase about “nontraditional methods such as electronic intrusion into an 
information and control network” signals the early development of an idea that was to 
become NCW two years after the publication of Joint Vision 2010, when Alberts 
published his work in 1999. 
Joint Vision 2020, published in 2000, makes more certain reference to the idea of 
network centricity.  In a section on Information Superiority, Vision 2020 states: 
The evolution of information technology will increasingly permit us to integrate 
the traditional forms of information operations with sophisticated all-source 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in a fully synchronized information 
campaign. The development of a concept labeled the global information grid will 
provide the network-centric environment required to achieve this goal. (DoD, 
2000: 9) 
 
The mention here of the Global Information Grid (GIG) points to the development of a 
key component of NCW.  The GIG continues to be built and developed.  In early 2004, 
Mr. Stenbit, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information 
Integration, reported that by the end of next year, DOD plans to build a base network 
connecting 100 locations throughout the world, involving mostly major headquarters, 
intelligence centers and some support organizations (Stone, 2005).  Such a large-scale 
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communications grid should serve as a sufficient hardware foundation, a vast tool upon 
which NCW can be fully developed, expanded, and exploited. 
In defining the concept of NCW as it applies specifically to the operations of The 
United States Air Force, Air Force Basic Doctrine of 17 November 2003 provides key 
insight into what this definition might look like.  While the exact term “network centric 
warfare” is not present in this document, there is reference to network warfare and 
network warfare operations, both of which fall under the main category of information 
operations.  The following definition would seem to be the closest match to a current 
definition of NCW in the context of the USAF: 
Network warfare operations are the integrated planning and employment of 
military capabilities to achieve desired effects across the digital battlespace. 
Network warfare operations are conducted in the information domain, which is 
composed of hardware, software, data, and human components.  Within this 
domain are the networks on which our information and information systems 
operate. Networks in this context are defined as any collection of systems 
transmitting information. This includes but is not limited to radio nets; satellite 
links; tactical digital information links (TADIL); telemetry; digital track files and 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems; telecommunications; 
and wireless communications networks and systems. The operational elements of 
network warfare operations are network attack, network defense, and network 
support. (DAF, 2003: 47) 
 
This definition provides a solid baseline for “network warfare”.  However, the constantly 
evolving concept of NCW has come to entail much more than this USAF doctrine 
definition captures. 
A current working definition for NCW being used by the (XPS) of Air Combat 
Command (ACC) at Langley AFB is as follows: “Network-centric warfare is the concept 
of linked sensors, communications systems, and weapons systems in an interconnected 
grid that allows for a seamless information flow to warfighters, policy makers, and 
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support personnel (ACC/XPS, 2004:10).  This definition captures key words that are 
essential to defining NCW: linked sensors, communications systems, interconnected 
grids, weapons systems, seamless information, and last but not least, warfighters, 
policy makers, and support personnel - the humans in the loop.  These are the kinds of 
terms that characterize the essence of NCW. 
 2.3.3 Definition of NCW for this Effort 
 This research effort is primarily focused on representing an NCW scenario within 
a combat model, specifically within the System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation 
(SEAS).  With this specific application and exercise of measuring NCW in mind, a 
somewhat customized definition of NCW must necessarily be formulated to conceptually 
match this application and provide a sufficient doctrinal baseline to guide this research.  
The following definition of NCW has been formulated for this effort: 
 Network Centric Warfare is the conduct of military operations through the 
utilization of networked information systems, which supply the warfighter with the 
right information at the right time in the right form to the right person being put to 
the right use, in order to achieve desired effects across the physical, information, 
and cognitive domains of warfare. 
2.4 Modeling NCW 
2.4.1 Introduction 
 As challenging as it is to formulate a current and accurate definition of NCW, it is 
perhaps even more challenging to take this definition and then represent NCW within the 
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context of a combat model.  There are several tools and approaches, however, which 
should prove very useful in modeling NCW. 
 Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) provides an effective representation of what 
Kewley and Larimer call the critical gap in military modeling capabilities, the ability to 
model how a combat soldier makes a tactical decision (Kewley and Larimer, 2003:10).  
The ability to represent agent decision making relates well to modeling NCW because the 
utility and overall effectiveness of a network cannot be properly evaluated without an 
accurate representation of the entities using the network and interacting within the 
network.  Kewley and Larimer state that the increased capability of network-centric 
forces, if it really exists, is an emergent property that cannot be proven with attrition-
based equations of combat.  Figure 3 depicts the progression of stages that occur in the 
combat decision making process.  ABM has the capability to effectively capture the 
cognition and judgment stages that occur in between the data/information levels and the 
final decision to act.  ABM does this through a set of pre-assigned rules given to agents 
within the model, which allow the agents to respond accordingly to inputs and 
conditions. 
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Figure 3.  Combat Decision Making Pyramid (Kewley and Larimer, 2003:10)  
  
 SEAS is a particular type of agent-based model that is well suited for use as a tool 
in modeling NCW.  SEAS is a model in the Air Force Standard Analysis Toolkit and is 
widely used for space mission utility studies (Walsh, Roberts, and Thompson, 2005:5-6).  
SEAS utilizes the fundamental principles of agent attributes and orders to model mission 
level combat scenarios and will serve as the primary modeling tool for this thesis 
research.  More specific details about ABM and SEAS are presented in the following two 
sections. 
2.4.2 Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) 
 Agent-based logic and programming is a relatively new approach to modeling in 
the military M&S community, tracing its roots to an initiative started within the U.S. 
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Marine Corps.  In October 1995, at the direction of the Commanding General of the 
United States Marine Corps Combat Development Command in Quantico, two scientists 
embarked on what is now called Project Albert (Brandstein, Home, and Friman, 
2000:64).  Project Albert used a combination of new models and tools, multidisciplinary 
teams, and the scientific method to understand how agent-based modeling techniques 
could be correctly applied to represent a broad spectrum of military operations.  In 
summary, Project Albert was designed to develop new tools to capture emergent behavior 
in synthetic environments that over time will lead to more effective maneuver warriors 
(Brandstein, Home, and Friman, 2000:65). 
 In addition to Project Albert, another significant element of the development of 
ABM was Irreducible Semi-Autonomous Adaptive Combat (ISAAC).  Dr. Andy 
Ilachinski developed the complex adaptive model to simulate the interactions between 
small groups of marines (Tighe, 1999:33).  Ilachinski determined that classical 
Lanchester-based models were not well suited for modeling the way in which the 
Marines conducted their operations.  The small, independent, and well-trained marine 
units did not behave according to the mass attrition rates and large force-on-force 
representations of warfare which Lanchester equations were originally formulated to 
model. 
Riding the momentum of Project Albert and ISAAC, ABM has since emerged as a 
modeling technique that is more realistic for today’s combat scenarios than are the 
classical Lanchester-based models.  Lanchester equations are deterministic differential 
equations.  The unalterable outcome of combat adjudication is based on the starting troop 
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strengths and their attrition rates (Tighe, 1999:28).  These equations provide a very 
simplistic and intuitive framework for modeling warfare.  However, Lanchester equations 
are very limited when it comes to representing the complex interactions of real-world 
combat because of their high degree of aggregation and constant attrition rate factors.  
Perhaps the greatest strength of ABM is its ability to effectively represent the random and 
unpredictable behavior of entities within a system, as well as the consequent outcomes 
resulting from interactions of such entities.  The effects of random individual agent 
behavior and of the resulting interactions of agents are phenomenon that traditional 
Lanchester equation-based models simply cannot capture. 
 The basic idea of agent-based modeling is that autonomous agents are given a set 
of rules, which determine how they will respond to a set list of inputs or conditions 
within the model.  An agent-based model is one in which the connections and 
interactions among the agents has significant effects, as compared to the individual 
actions of any particular agent (Kewley and Larimer, 2003:11).  A basic summary 
definition of ABM from the SEAS website is as follows: 
 In agent-based modeling, complex, real-world systems are modeled as collection 
 of autonomous decision making entities, called agents. Each agent individually 
 assesses its situation and makes decisions based upon its own set of rules. Agents 
 may execute various behaviors appropriate for the system they represent - for 
 example, sensing, maneuvering, or engaging.  (SPARTA, Inc., 2005) 
 
ABM results in a realistic simulation of a system because it emulates the manner in 
which the world really operates (Cares, 2002:935).  Red and Blue forces make up a 
dynamic, non-linear, complex adaptive system in which the overall system behavior 
emerges from the aggregate interactions among individual agents (Cares, 2002:936). 
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2.4.3 SEAS 
 SEAS is a constructive, agent-interaction based simulation designed specifically 
for exploratory analysis of transformational, information-driven warfare across surface, 
air and space domains (SPARTA, Inc., 2005).  It is an agent based combat model 
developed and maintained by SPARTA, Inc. for the Space and Missile Systems Center 
Directorate of Transformation and Development (SMC/TD).  SEAS is one of the models 
in the Air Force Standard Analysis Toolkit.  SEAS is quickly becoming a popularly 
utilized software tool in the defense M&S community, especially within the USAF. 
 SEAS has the ability to model the presence and interaction of a large variety of 
unique agents within a combat mission scenario.  Some examples of the agents that can 
be represented in SEAS are tanks, SAM sites, UAVs, fighter jets, and satellites.  A 
typical mission scenario which SEAS has the capability of representing is shown in 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  SEAS mission scenario representation (SPARTA, Inc., 2005:slide 2) 
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 As illustrated in the above graphic, SEAS can not only represent various combat 
agents, but also their respective sensors and communication devices.  SEAS is built 
around three simple entities: agents, devices and environments.  Essentially, agents 
interact through the use of devices (weapons, sensors, communication) with each other 
and the environment.  Conflict outcomes emerge from these resulting interactions.  
Agents are logical members acting within the combat mission scenario.  They can be 
units, such as a brigade or multi-ship formation of planes, or subunit members such as a 
vehicle, individual plane, or satellite.  Devices are entities such as communications 
devices, sensors, and weapons.  The environment is the battlespace, which consists of 
events, locations, terrain, weather, jamming, and day/night characteristics. 
 A SEAS agent has the capability to move around, sense things, talk to other 
agents, utilize and acquire resources, and kill other agents in an environment.  Agents can 
be assigned orders from superiors and can also be given “local programming” that will 
override the original orders in a given situation, if certain requirements and conditions 
are met.  Agents can also play various roles such as an observer, killer, or even 
leader/controller of other agents.  Each agent with sensing capability keeps a list of 
targets to be prepared to carry out an order either to 1) do nothing, 2) move toward them, 
3) move away from them, 4) tell others about them, or 5) kill them or perform some 
combination of the above (SPARTA, Inc., 2005:slide 5).  Agents and their respective 
interactions follow four key concepts: the local target list (LTL), local orders list (LOL), 
target interactions range (TIR), and broadcast interval (BI).  All four of these key 
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concepts interact with each specific type of agent and the scenario environment to 
produce conflict outcomes within SEAS. 
2.5 Measures of NCW 
 There are several difficulties faced when trying to form a clear definition of NCW 
and formulate an appropriate model to represent it.  The task of determining appropriate 
and measurable metrics for NCW also poses a difficult and unique challenge.  There are a 
wealth of measures that have been formulated to date and recorded in various documents 
and references.  For example, Fewell and Hazen provide a comprehensive list in the form 
of several tables which describe a large number of possible NCW metrics.  Alberts laid a 
basic guideline for metrics, as shown by Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  Alberts Baseline Metrics (Alberts, Gartska, and Stein, 1999:219) 
 
 Infostructure Performance, Battlespace Awareness, Battlespace Knowledge, 
Exploiting Battlespace Knowledge, and Military Utility are general categories under 
which more exactly defined metrics for NCW fall.  Fewell and Hazen describe metrics 
for the characteristic ‘speed of command’, force agility and the ability to amass effects, 
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the ‘degree of autonomy’ aspect of self-synchronization, the level of shared situational 
awareness, the conduct of effects-based operations, reachback operations, information 
superiority, the degree of interoperability, and mutual trust.  All total, thirty-three 
different metrics falling under these main headings are described in their document.  
However, as Fewell and Hazen point out, none of these metrics serve as an indicator of 
the level of network centricity even though they do describe characteristics of net-centric 
systems (Fewell and Hazen, 2003:37).  Further, they propose that the key characteristic 
of network centricity is the broadening of warfighter focus away from the individual, unit 
or platform concerns to give primacy to the mission and responsibilities of the team, task 
group or coalition.  Quantifying this ‘broadening of focus’ is a difficult problem, 
especially when one tries to do so in a sense that is independent of a specific scenario. 
 Ling, Moon, and Kruzins (2005) propose more quantifiable metrics for measuring 
network centric warfare in the form of connectivity, reach, richness, and characteristic 
tempos.  Figure 6 shows interactions between the OODA loop and these various metrics. 
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Figure 6.  OODA Cycle with Proposed Metrics (Ling, Moon, and Kruzins, 2005:10) 
 
 Perhaps the simplest and most straight-forward place to start in quantifying and 
measuring a force’s degree of NCW capability is to focus on network transmission delay 
time and the corresponding time required to make a decision to act.  This second metric, 
decision time, may be more difficult to track and measure than network delay time.  
SPARTA proposes the use of NETE and SEAS as a way to measure network delay time, 
stating that one way to use these tools together is to use measures of performance 
(MOPs) from NETE to represent network delay times in the SEAS model where the 
overall campaign is simulated (Walsh, Roberts, and Thompson, 2005:6). 
2.6 Summary 
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 The push for military transformation received significant motivational energy 
when terrorists invaded our homeland with a domestic aerial invasion on September 11th, 
2001.  The stark realization that our nation was not supremely safe and secure elevated 
the cause of military transformation and modernization from an identified need to an 
urgent and absolute necessity.  The concept of EBO has been employed, with NCW 
being recruited as a key enabler of EBO, to meet this new demand for maximized 
situational awareness and decision-making supremacy.  Having established NCW as a 
critical area of military exploration and application, the natural follow-on activity of 
clearly defining NCW has presented a unique and continually morphing challenge.  
Several key documents and resources, including David S. Albert’s foundational work on 
NCW and the Joint Vision documents, were utilized in the formulation of a fundamental 
definition of NCW for this research effort.  Following this conceptual framework for 
NCW, options for modeling NCW were discussed.  In particular, agent-based modeling 
was described and proposed as a legitimate way to represent the interactions and 
concepts of NCW.  A specific application of ABM, the simulation software SEAS, was 
selected as the chosen tool for constructing a scenario for use in analyzing the military 
worth of NCW.  Finally, several options for measures of effectiveness were described 
and a few key measures were chosen for the purposes of representation and analysis in 
SEAS. 
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III. Methodology 
 
3.1 Overview 
 A SEAS scenario possessing a relatively high degree of complexity is required to 
adequately characterize the key elements of conducting NCW, namely the operation and 
coordination of sensors, communication devices, weapons systems and decision-making 
entities.  An appropriate scenario which meets these criteria had already been created 
prior to this thesis effort and was utilized by DeStefano and Zinn for their collaborative 
thesis efforts in 2004.  The scenario was written in SEAS to represent a mission scenario 
typical of the Kosovo conflict during 1999. 
The following sections provide a description of the Kosovo scenario background, 
warfile, verification and validation (V&V), and NCW features.  Then, the selected 
measures that will be extracted from the Kosovo scenario and analyzed for their military 
worth within the context of NCW are described.  Next, the analysis approach describing 
the specific procedure and statistical tools are covered.  Finally, this Methodology 
chapter concludes with a brief summary of all the topics covered and important points to 
keep in mind before proceeding to the next chapter, Analysis. 
3.2 SEAS Kosovo Scenario 
3.2.1 Background 
 The Space and Missile Center Transformation Directorate (SMC/TD) has created 
a warfile in SEAS to represent a typical mission in the Kosovo war (DeStefano, 2004:3-
3).  The SEAS warfile was created for the Air Force by the MITRE Corporation in 
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Hampton, VA (DeStefano, 2004:3-1).  The scenario consists of a Blue United States Air 
Forces in Europe (USAFE) force, a Red Serbian force, and a Brown Kosovar force of 
militia and civilians, all programmed to operate and interact within the context of typical 
operations in the Kosovo conflict during 1999.  It essentially models Red forces 
conducting “ethnic cleansing” operations against the Brown civilians (Zinn, 2004:48).  
Blue force’s objective is to stop the Red force from killing the Brown force.  Blue 
achieves this objective by attacking the Red force and by attempting to contain their 
military operations and movements. 
 DeStefano utilized the Kosovo scenario as an architectural data product to 
represent the Time Critical Targeting (TCT) activities of the Air Operations Center 
(AOC) (DeStefano, 2004:iv).  DeStefano made needed additions and adjustments to the 
original Kosovo scenario delivered by SMC/TD to fit his research and analysis needs as 
he sought to demonstrate the significance of Time Critical Targeting (TCT) activities of 
the AOC.  The version used by DeStefano and Zinn for their thesis efforts is the same 
version of the Kosovo scenario that will be utilized in modeling NCW for this research 
effort. 
3.2.2 Kosovo Scenario Warfile 
 The programming code used within the SEAS interface is called Tactical 
Programming Language (TPL).  Multiple lines of TPL compose a file designated as the 
“warfile”, which contains all the necessary information concerning locations, agents, 
their sensors, weapons, and communication capabilities, as well as the orders followed by 
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each agent.  Figure 7 shows an example of SEAS TPL from the Kosovo warfile which 
gives agent attributes and order for the Blue SOF_ReconSqdEast unit.   
 
Figure 7.  Example of TPL Code from the Kosovo Warfile 
 
 Each line of code is numbered on the far left margin.  All of the unit attributes for 
SOF_ReconSqdEast are listed in this block of TPL.  Below the attributes is a list of the 
various communication devices utilized by the SOF agents.  Also shown in Figure 7 are 
orders which each agent will follow as they interact in the scenario.  In this case, the SOF 
agents are assigned a priority list for target sighting reporting purposes.  Comments in 
TPL are preceded by two exclamation marks and given a light blue color in the warfile. 
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 A typical SEAS warfile is structured in sequential blocks that designate the 
timing, location, and force composition of the scenario.  The Kosovo scenario warfile 
follows this same general format. The first lines of TPL state that the scenario takes place 
well in the future, on August 2nd, 2016.  The scenario date is, for all practical purposes, 
arbitrary.  It simply provides a timeline reference from which to track the flow of combat 
activities.  This TPL for event timing in the Kosovo warfile allows for a possible 20-day 
scenario that will end on August 22nd, 2016.  However, as noted by DeStefano and 
confirmed by runs for this thesis effort, no significant activity occurred after 6000 
minutes (100 hours or 4.17 days) of simulation time, and no event based criteria to stop 
the simulation was uncovered (e.g. all Serbian forces are killed or withdrew) (DeStefano, 
2004:4-2).   
 
Figure 8.  Sensor Detection Activity for Key Kosovo Scenario Agents 
 
 Figure 8 confirms the drop-off in activity as measured by activity of sensors for 
several key agents after 100 hours.  Although the Global Hawk exhibits a few detections 
for hours 108 and 109, all activity has essentially ceased for all other major players after 
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100 hours and therefore this run time will also be used as the run time for multiple 
simulation replications. 
 Location information follows the event timing block of the warfile.  A graphical 
depiction showing several of the key locations for the scenario is illustrated in Figure 9.  
These location lines of code specify key locations for the Kosovo scenario, all of which 
are assigned a name (e.g. the point for Aviano AFB in the figure’s upper left-hand 
corner) and are coded in the warfile according to their coordinates of latitude and 
longitude. 
 
Figure 9.  Kosovo Scenario Locations 
 
 This figure shows several Tactical Area of Operations (TAO) areas, all of which 
are shown as irregular shapes bounded with black lines.  The largest TAO, 
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BalkanWxTAO, represents a region of weather whose attributes, primarily altitude range 
and intensity factor, degrade communication signals’ transmission/reception and sensor 
performance occurring in the areas bounded by the TAO.  Another significant TAO, 
KosovoTAO, lies within the BalkanWxTAO.  Also shown in this figure are the GH_Orbit, 
Predator_Orbit, Gunship_Orbit, JSTARS_Orbit, and SOF Patrol TAOs which specify 
aircraft orbits and troop patrol areas, respectively. 
 
Figure 10.  Weather and Terrain Effects in SEAS (SEAS Training CD Slides, 2005: slide 
274) 
 
 Figure 10 illustrates the specific attributes within SEAS that are affected by 
weather and terrain TAO areas.  Weather is listed as affecting platform speed, sensor 
probability of detection, weapon probability of kill, and communications reliability.  
Terrain is listed as affecting platform speed, sensor range, weapon range, and 
communications range.  It is important to keep in mind that the degradation effects 
implemented in the Kosovo scenario are being utilized as generic ways to degrade 
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network performance on a large-scale (BalkanWxTAO) and more local scale 
(KosovoTAO), both of which affect unique aspects of performance.  The KosovoTAO 
draws the boundary for a terrain region whose degradation factor degrades the ability of 
the Blue Force’s UAV to see targets and therefore makes the simulation of the UAV 
patrolling the area more realistic.  In other words, agents will occasionally be hidden 
from the UAV’s view because the terrain factor (which ranges from 0 to 1 in SEAS and 
is set at 0.8 for the KosovoTAO) is applied to all sensing operations within that TAO and 
will only allow a percentage of line of sight detections to occur.  For instance, within the 
KosovoTAO, only eighty percent of the target sightings in that region will be officially 
recorded as a clean detection. 
 
Figure 11.  Kosovo Scenario Weather and Terrain Blocks TPL 
 
Figure 11 shows the TPL for the Balkan weather block and Kosovo terrain block.  
The KosovoTAO terrain factor of 0.8 can be seen here, as well as the BalkanWxTAO 
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attributes of altitude range (10 to 15 kilometers) and degradation factor of zero.  The zero 
degradation factor for BalkanWxTAO means that no communication or image detection 
can be accomplished if it has to pass through this region.  For instance, if one of the 
satellites in the scenario searches for targets in the BalkanWxTAO, it will not detect 
anything and also will not be able to broadcast any information into that region.  
 
Figure 12.  Blue Force Structure 
 
Now that the timing, location, TAO, weather, and terrain blocks have been 
covered, the TPL sections for the forces, units, and vehicle hierarchy of the scenario must 
be described.  As has been previously mentioned, there are three forces in the Kosovo 
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scenario: a USAFE force, Serbian force, and Kosovar force.  Figure 12 gives a graphical 
depiction and breakdown of the Blue USAFE force. 
 As can be seen from this figure, the Blue force has a considerable number of units 
and vehicles, especially in relation to the Red and Brown forces, which are depicted in 
Figures 13 and 14.  All units for the Blue force fall under and are owned by the USAF 
Combined Aerospace Operations Center (CAOC), which is referred to as the “parent 
unit” for the Blue force.  The significance of the parent unit is that a parent’s orders take 
precedence over any orders that each individual “child unit” (units that are subordinate to 
the parent) may have within their own code block.   The Blue Force Structure illustration 
depicts the typical force breakdown within SEAS, in which units are composed of 
vehicles (e.g. the F15_SEADSqdn is composed of multiple F-15s), each having the 
potential of owning sensors, communication devices, and weapons.  For example, the 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) units of East and West (West unit breakdown is not 
shown in Figure 12 since its composition is identical to the East unit) both own the 
communication device SOF_Ord, the sensor SOF_scope, and the weapon M4_Carbine.  
The numbers in parenthesis following any name in the hierarchy indicates the quantity of 
a particular unit or vehicle within the Kosovo scenario.  For instance, the Blue Force has 
two SOF_ReconSqnEast units, nine SOF_ReconSqd_Mem vehicles, and the F-15s each 
have two JSOW and two HARM weapons.  While the Blue force is quite capable on the 
ground with the SOF units, the major emphasis of the force is on air assets and the 
application of air power. 
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 The Red Serbian force, shown in Figure 13, is much simpler in comparison to the 
Blue force.  The Serbian force is not centralized as is the blue force possessing the 
CAOC unit agent, which owns all other blue agents.  The Red force consists solely of 
ground assets of the Serbian Army.  Serbian unit agents include air defenses, ground 
targets, and three army divisions (DeStefano, 2004:3-5). 
 
Figure 13.  Serbian Force Structure (DeStefano, 2004:3-6) 
 
 The Serbian surface-to-air missile capabilities present the greatest threat to the 
Blue force in terms of attrition, based on initial experimental runs of the scenario.  
However, since the goal of the Blue force in the scenario is to minimize the impact of 
Serbian Army operations on the Kosovars, ultimately the three Serbian armor units are 
the most threatening members of the Red force in terms of Blue achieving its objective.  
Orders are passed from the five main Serbian unit agents to their subordinate agents, but 
there is not the degree of coordination of the Blue force since these five units essentially 
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act autonomously.  This is a fairly obvious, and yet true to life, weakness for the Serbian 
force.  The Serbian force behaves according to a realistic concept of operations.  For 
instance, the surface to air radar vans are given orders to hide when information is passed 
that an F-15 is near, or to hide and move after firing a missile (DeStefano, 2004:3-5). 
 
Figure 14.  Kosovar Force Structure (DeStefano, 2004:3-7) 
 
 The Brown Kosovar force is similar to the Red Serbian force in the sense that 
there is no centralized command structure, as seen in Figure 14.  The Kosovars force 
consists of farmers, refugees, villagers, or militia members.  The militia members are the 
only armed agents of the Brown force and they are enemies with the Serbian force, but 
are neutral in relation to the Blue force.  The Kosovar agents have extremely rudimentary 
sensing and transmitting capabilities such as unaided human eyes, cell phones, and even 
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bells, all of which are coded in the warfile as devices whose attributes have been assigned 
to match the low strength and low range of these types of sensors and communication 
devices. 
 Instead of the Kosovars being placed in aggregated masses at certain locations 
they can be modeled as agents who can pass along information to the U.S. forces and 
hide from the enemy (DeStefano, 2004:3-5).  In this sense, the Kosovars can be viewed 
as allies to the Blue force.  However, since they are only able to offer limited combat 
support, they would more accurately be labeled as a neutral force in this scenario. 
3.2.3 Warfile Verification and Validation 
 DeStefano describes various verification and validation (V&V) activities applied 
to the Kosovo scenario warfile in his thesis effort.  He states that some of the standard 
methods employed in the V&V process for his effort were a structured walk-through of 
the code, consultation with experts, viewing the animation, and looking for reasonable 
output (DeStefano, 2004:3-24).  Every time agent orders changed, DeStefano performed 
a structured walk-through of the warfile code and utilized the SEAS details and debug 
window to ensure that global and local variables were appropriately updated so that agent 
orders were correct and current.  Further, DeStefano consulted with experts at SMC (a 
primary user of SEAS), Sparta Inc. (model managers), and RAND (analysts) throughout 
his use and modification of the warfile (DeStefano, 2004:3-24).  SEAS animation proved 
to play a key role in DeStefano’s V&V process.  For instance, movement of the global 
hawk away from its TAO to investigate a potential target was confirmed by viewing 
SEAS animation of the Kosovo warfile. 
 40
 A few additional investigations were performed during this thesis research to 
further verify and validate the Kosovo SEAS model.  For instance, through initial 
exploratory checks of the Kosovo scenario TPL and SEAS animation, it was observed 
that one of the scenario’s three satellites, Elint_SAT, held an extremely high altitude 
orbit.  The orbit was so high relative to the other two satellites that it seemed at first to be 
a programming error.  Figure 15 shows a screen capture of this satellite’s location, as 
well as the location of the other two USAFE satellites. 
 
Figure 15.  Kosovo Scenario Satellite Picture 
 
 The lines and circles emanating from each satellite show the sensor field of regard 
for each respective satellite relative to the earth.  Upon further investigation of the warfile 
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orbit information (which is contained in a *.sat file that is called out within the Kosovo 
scenario warfile), it was discovered that the Elint_SAT is a geosynchronous satellite.  For 
a satellite's orbit period to be one sidereal day (the time it takes the Earth to rotate 360 
degrees, which is equal to 23 hours, 56 minutes and 4 seconds), it must be approximately 
35,786 kilometers (19,323 nautical miles or 22,241 statute miles) above the earth's 
surface (NASA Liftoff Home, 1995).  Through utilization of the kilometer scale for 
screen width given by SEAS in its graphics display (shown to be 125,802.699 kilometers 
in Figure 15, which is not to scale for this illustration due to image cropping), it was 
concluded that Elint_SAT is indeed approximately 35,786 kilometers above the earth’s 
surface.  Therefore, the Elint_SAT altitude in the scenario matches the real-world altitude 
of a geosynchronous satellite.  Also, SAT1 and SAT2 occupy orbits that allow them to 
sweep the Kosovo area once every 12 hours.  This verification confirms that the satellite 
orbits are realistic and contributes to an increased confidence level that the Kosovo 
scenario as a whole is written and composed correctly.  Similar checks for scenario 
accuracy were performed for various other platforms and agents throughout the Kosovo 
warfile in order to verify that that the scenario was properly coded. 
 Validation of results from SEAS was performed primarily as face validation 
throughout the analysis process.  This face validation consisted of common sense checks 
of the output values for detection distances, times of detections, communication channel 
activity, and kill numbers. 
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 3.2.4 Kosovo Scenario NCW Features 
 There are several key elements of the Kosovo scenario that allow it to be used as 
a scenario which legitimately represents and applies the concepts of NCW.  Drawing 
from the various NCW definitions covered in the Literature Review, the concept of 
linked sensors was highlighted in the definition of NCW used by Air Combat 
Command’s Future Plans (ACC/XPS) division.  A count of sensors in the Kosovo warfile 
shows that 20 total sensors are used in the scenario: 13 sensors belong to the Blue 
USAFE force, four sensors belong to the Red Serbian force, and three sensors belong to 
the Brown Kosovar force.  Some of these sensors are shared, such as the 
BluAir2GndRadar and AC_Elint used by both the F-15s and F-16s.  ACC/XPS also 
highlighted linked communications as another key component of NCW.  The Kosovo 
scenario holds 23 total communication channels: 17 channels belong to the Blue USAFE 
force, three channels belong to the Red Serbian force, and three channels belong to the 
Brown Kosovar force.  Many of these communication channels, especially on the Blue 
force side, are shared between several different units and vehicles.  The linked sensors 
and communications aspects of NCW are definitely captured in the Kosovo scenario. 
This interconnected grid of sensing and communication devices allows for the operation 
of linked weapons systems and creates shared situational awareness in the scenario, 
especially among the Blue USAFE force units and vehicles. 
3.3 Selected Measures 
 Based on the outputs available from SEAS and the analysis options provided by 
the SEAS Post Processor (an Excel-based analysis tool), the focus for selected measures 
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in this research has been placed primarily on the physical and information domains of 
NCW.  For the physical domain, the most appropriate measure seems to be sensor 
detection distance.  The SEAS Post Processor provides extensive capability for the 
filtering, graphing, and raw data analysis of detection distances for each sensor active in 
the scenario.  The average detection distances for key platforms will be analyzed for 
trends in performance over the four cases of the Kosovo scenario.  Also, the average 
number of detections per replication will be looked at for these same key platforms. 
 For the information domain, the load on the communications network for various 
key channels in the Kosovo scenario will be measured.  The SEAS Post Processor will 
also be employed for this analysis, as well as use of Excel to directly manipulate and 
filter the raw data of communication outputs from SEAS.  SEAS keeps track of three 
communications metrics:  the number of messages added, the number of messages 
currently on, and the number of messages removed for each communications channel 
over each one-minute time step of the simulation.  The data that tracks this running tally 
of communications channel loading will be utilized to analyze performance of the Blue 
Force’s communications channels in order to determine the effects of applying various 
degradation levels in the Kosovo region. 
 Even though no direct measure for the cognitive domain will be extracted from 
the Kosovo scenario for this effort, an indirect measure of the cognitive domain will be 
analyzed.  The chosen measure to gauge the quality and success of decisions made by 
agents in the scenario is the killer and victim data tracked by SEAS as a standard output.  
The Killer Victim Scoreboard (KVS) is a useful tool within the SEAS Post Processor for 
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filtering, analyzing, and presenting information pertaining to the number of kills 
throughout the scenario, as well as the identity of the killer and victim and the timing 
during which the kill occurs.  KVS information will be compared for the four cases in 
order to determine the ultimate effect of degrading the performance of sensors and 
communications equipment.  The analysis will focus on comparing the number of Red 
Force Serbian agents killed by Blue Force USAFE agents, the number of Blue killed by 
Red, and the number of Brown Force Kosovars killed. 
3.4 Analysis Approach 
 Multiple replications of the Kosovo scenario will be run in a configuration that is 
free of weather and terrain effects.  The measures described in Section 3.3 will be 
collected from these multiple runs of the scenario and analyzed to find the mean and 
standard deviation values and confidence intervals will be constructed for these outputs.  
Next, the scenario will be run multiple times in a configuration where weather and terrain 
TAO effects are applied separately to degrade the sensing and communication operations, 
respectively.  The resulting average sensor distances for all sensors detecting enemies in 
the scenario will be analyzed for both cases.  Then, multiple runs applying both weather 
and terrain effects will be performed.  The resulting average detection distances from the 
full weather and terrain effects scenario will then be analyzed in the same manner as the 
cases applying weather effects only and terrain effects only.  The resulting average 
detection distances for all sensing agents will be compared to base case outputs.  Output 
analysis in the form of a two-sided t-test will be performed to determine whether the 
differences between the three configurations’ outputs and the base case outputs are 
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statistically significant.  From this comparison and analysis, various insights and 
conclusions will be drawn concerning the results and performance of all three forces in 
the Kosovo scenario, all determined and presented in light of NCW principles. 
3.5 Summary 
 This section has described the background, warfile, verification and validation, 
and NCW features of the Kosovo scenario SEAS warfile.  The warfile was originally 
written by SMC/TD and used by DeStefano and Zinn for their theses.  Essentially, the 
Kosovo scenario depicts an ethnic cleansing operation in which the role of the Blue 
USAFE force is to stop the Red Serbian force from killing the Brown Kosovar force.  
Warfile TPL code analysis, expert consultation, simulation animation checks, and 
scenario output analysis were used in the V&V process for the Kosovo warfile.  These 
V&V activities were conducted both by DeStefano for his thesis effort and for this 
current effort to model NCW.  Key features of NCW were cited as being present in the 
Kosovo scenario.  These NCW features primarily relate to the high degree of linked 
sensors, communication, and weapons systems contained in the scenario.  SEAS 
measures for the physical and information domain were chosen.  For the physical 
domain, target detection distance is the selected measure to be extracted from multiple 
simulation runs.  The average detection distances for all sensing vehicles and agents in 
the scenario will be analyzed using the SEAS Post Processor.  For the information 
domain, communications channels loading and activity will be analyzed.  Both the 
number of messages and timing of these messages throughout the scenario will be 
analyzed and comparisons made between the four scenario cases.  These selected 
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measures will be the focus for analysis of outputs taken from multiple simulation runs.  
The analysis will determine the average output values from the base case scenario, as 
well as for three cases in which weather only, terrain only, and a combination of weather 
and terrain effects will be added into the scenario.  The next chapter, Analysis, presents 
the outputs and statistical analysis resulting from the accomplishment of multiple 
simulation replications. 
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IV. Analysis 
 
4.1 Overview 
 This chapter provides statistical analysis and results as well as a description of the 
process involved in determining what Kosovo scenario platforms and outputs are worth 
focusing on for the sake of measuring NCW.  The chapter begins by laying out 
preliminary analysis conducted to determine an appropriate number of simulation runs.  
Next, there is a section about detection distance analysis pertaining to the physical 
domain of NCW, followed by an investigation and analysis of communication channel 
loading for the information domain.  The chapter then concludes with a section covering 
the analysis of kill numbers, which serve as a final measure of agent decision output for 
the cognitive domain, followed by a brief chapter summary. 
4.2 Selecting the Number of Simulation Replications 
 A preliminary task of simulation analysis is to select the number of replications to 
run in SEAS in order to obtain output data sets which have desirable statistical properties.  
Tentatively, 100 runs were chosen as the target number of replications.  However, due to 
the extensive time required to run the Kosovo scenario 100 times (one hour per 100 runs, 
times four for each case) and the considerable file size of output data from initial checks 
of running the scenario ten, twenty, and thirty times (sensor output data files for thirty 
runs were in the 350-450 MB range), it was discovered that working with 100 runs was 
not a practical approach.  To strike a balance between obtaining a sufficient amount of 
data to ensure the ability to make legitimate statistical inferences, while at the same time 
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keeping the time required to perform the simulation replications and output file sizes 
within reasonable limits, thirty simulation replications was chosen as the new target. 
 A check for normality was performed for outputs of average detection data for 
different sensors at the levels of ten, twenty, and thirty replications.  Output data from the 
JSTARS was selected as the focus for this normality check because preliminary analysis 
of model outputs showed that the JSTARS agent provided the highest number of detection 
samples over each replication and therefore data from this platform seemed to provide a 
fair representation of the overall distribution of data for platforms in the scenario as a 
whole. 
 
Figure 16.  Check for Normality - Plots from Arena Input Analyzer 
 
 Figure 16 shows the increasing progression of data normality from analysis of the 
average detection distance output for the JSTARS resulting from ten, twenty, and thirty 
replications.  The square error for a normal distribution fit decreases from 0.03 to 0.007 
as the number of replications is increased from ten to thirty.  These statistical distribution 
plots offer support for the assumption that thirty simulation runs is a sufficient number to 
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obtain approximately normally distributed output data from multiple runs of the Kosovo 
scenario. 
4.3 Physical Domain Analysis 
 4.3.1 Single Run Analysis - Targets and Sensors of Interest 
 Preliminary analysis of sensor detection distances for the physical domain of 
NCW began with determining which sensors were programmed in the Kosovo warfile as 
being affected by the degradation effects.  The illustration in Figure 17 was used as a 
guide throughout the detection distance analysis.  The figure helped to track which 
sensors were influenced by which TAO degradation effects.  The figure illustrates that 
Sat1, Sat2, the GlobalHawk, and the Predator_UAV were all coded in the Kosovo warfile 
as being effected by both weather and terrain effects, while the Elint_SAT was affected 
only by the weather TAO and the JSTARS was affected only by the terrain TAO.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the weather and terrain effects influence specific performance 
attributes.  Weather affects platform speed, sensor probability of detection, weapon 
probability of kill, and communications reliability.  Terrain affects platform speed, sensor 
range, weapon range, and communications range.  The degradation effects are 
implemented to degrade network performance in the two distinct TAO regions according 
to their respective influence on performance attributes. 
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Figure 17.  Blue Force Sensors Affected by Network Degradation Effects 
 
 Graphical trends seen in average detection distance plots for a single run of the 
Kosovo scenario helped to focus the subsequent analysis of data gained from thirty 
replications.  Figure 18 is a SEAS Post Processor plot of average detection distance data 
from one run of the full effects case.  The agents listed on the “Sensors” and “Targets” 
axes are not all inclusive for the sake of space and clarity of reading in the figure.  
Therefore, the hash marks on the “Sensors” axis listing F15E#1, F15E#3, and F15E#6, 
for example, represent the whole group of F-15E agents.  Similarly, the specific listings 
on the “Targets” axis for individual members of the RedSA6, Serb_Armor, and Ktractor 
units are not representative of those types of agents for that region of the axis.  Since 
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there is only one JSTARS in the scenario, its hash mark on the “Sensors” axis correctly 
lines up with the JSTARS row of average detection distances versus various type of 
target. 
 
Figure 18.  Average Detection Distance Versus Various Targets and Sensors 
 
 Several trends and points of interest can be gleaned concerning the behavior of 
agents within the Kosovo scenario from this plot.  First of all, the JSTARS is the most 
active and effective Blue force sensor, clearly seeing the most Red targets and at the 
farthest average ranges, anywhere from 20 to 120 kilometers.  Also, the F-15’s are fairly 
effective at detecting Red armor and surface-to-air threats, but not nearly to the range of 
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the JSTARS.  Last, the Red radar vans are detecting the F-15’s fairly consistently and 
from distances of 20 to 100 kilometers, which is much farther away than the F-15’s are 
seeing their targets, although the F-15’s can be cued by other Blue ISR assets. 
 Seeing these detection trends from single run output data was very helpful in 
better approaching the thirty runs analysis.  From this single run analysis, it was learned 
which sensor platforms would be most worth focusing comparative performance analysis 
on for the three degraded scenario cases versus the baseline case.  Also, knowing which 
targets were being detected by which sensors helped to provide a fuller understanding of 
what types of detections the more aggregated data for thirty runs was truly representing. 
 4.3.2 Thirty Runs Analysis - Four Cases Output Comparison 
 The second phase of analysis conducted for detection distances of the Kosovo 
scenario was to compare average detection distance outputs from thirty runs of the 
baseline case, which has no weather or terrain effects, versus average detection distance 
outputs from thirty runs of the three states of network degradation (represented as the 
application of weather only, terrain only, and weather and terrain effects combined).  The 
goal of this analysis is to determine whether the difference between case outputs is 
statistically significant.  A paired-t confidence interval approach is selected as the 
statistical tool to test for this difference, with the key indicator of statistical difference 
being whether or not zero is included in the confidence interval for difference in outputs.  
If zero is included in the confidence interval, then there cannot be a conclusion of 
statistical difference between the two model outputs being compared. 
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 The procedure of the paired-t confidence interval approach involves first defining 
the variable jZ  as 
j j jZ X Y= − ,             (1) 
where jX  is the random variable average output from the baseline model.  For the 
analysis of Kosovo scenario outputs, jX  represents average output for the baseline case, 
where no terrain and weather effects are present.  jY  is the random variable output from 
the model against which the baseline is being compared.  In the context of the Kosovo 
scenario, jY  represents the three degraded cases of terrain effects only, weather only, and 
combination of weather and terrain.  The expected value of the 'jZ s  is 
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Table 1.  Satellites Paired-t Test Detection Distance Analysis 
Satellite #1 
Difference Between 
Baseline and:
95 % Confidence 
Interval
Statistical 
Difference?
Percentage Change 
from Baseline:
Full Effects 178.30 (166.38,190.23) Yes -13.75
Terrain Only 174.57 (165.88, 183.26) Yes -13.46
Weather Only 15.91 (3.18, 28.63) Yes -1.23
Satellite #2 
Difference Between 
Baseline and:
95 % Confidence 
Interval
Statistical 
Difference?
Percentage Change 
from Baseline:
Full Effects 176.66 (164.02, 189.30) Yes -13.80
Terrain Only 164.00 (154.65, 173.35) Yes -12.81
Weather Only 18.05 (0.36, 35.75) Yes -1.41
( )Z n
( )Z n
 
 Table 1 shows ( )Z n and the 95% confidence interval (α = 0.05) for Sat1.  The 
full paired-t test results and analysis are listed in Appendix A.  The table lists whether or 
not statistically significant differences exist between each degraded case and the baseline 
model case for average detection distance outputs and also the percentage change in the 
average detection distance from the baseline case.  Table 1 illustrates that both satellites’ 
average detection distance ranges are clearly reduced, especially in the full effects and 
terrain only cases.  It is a bit surprising that the weather case did not hinder the average 
detection distance more severely for both satellites.  This could be due to the fact that 
both satellites are detecting targets less frequently in the weather case, as the weather 
factor of zero in the TPL eliminates line of sight target viewing for each satellite.  
Detections are still possible for the satellites on the edges of the weather TAO, but a 
smaller number of detections may be limiting observance of the true degradation affect in 
the weather only case. 
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Table 2.  F-15 Squadron Paired-t Test Detection Distance Analysis 
F-15E#1
Difference Between 
Baseline and:
95 % Confidence 
Interval
Statistical 
Difference?
Percentage Change 
from Baseline:
Full Effects -0.44 (-6.19, 5.31) No 1.05
Terrain Only -6.56 (-11.71, -1.41) Yes 15.78
Weather Only 1.56 (-4.75, 7.87) No -3.75
F-15E#4
Difference Between 
Baseline and:
95 % Confidence 
Interval
Statistical 
Difference?
Percentage Change 
from Baseline:
Full Effects 0.38 (-8.22, 8.97) No -0.92
Terrain Only -2.15 (-8.45, 4.16) No 5.20
Weather Only 3.07 (-2.83, 8.97) No -7.42
All 6 F-15's Together
Difference Between 
Baseline and:
95 % Confidence 
Interval
Statistical 
Difference?
Percentage Change 
from Baseline:
Full Effects 0.49 (-3.39, 4.37) No -1.18
Terrain Only -3.07 (-7.05, 0.91) No 7.38
Weather Only 0.62 (-2.99, 4.23) No -1.49
( )Z n
( )Z n
( )Z n
 
 
 Table 2 shows ( )Z n , the 95% confidence intervals, and percentage changes in 
average detection distances versus the baseline case for F-15E#1, F-15E#4, and the F-15 
squadron as a whole.  This table illustrates that, except for the F-15#1 comparison of the 
baseline with the terrain only effect, there is no statistical difference between the average 
F-15 squadron detection distances for all of the three case comparison variations versus 
the base case.  This is essentially the expected result since the F-15’s are not coded in the 
Kosovo warfile as being affected by the weather or terrain TAO.  However, the 
improvement in F-15#1’s average detection distance in the case where only terrain 
effects are applied is not clearly understood.  Perhaps this improvement in average 
detection distance is due to the fact that the satellites’ detection distances are severely 
hampered and therefore F-15#1 is not able to rely on cueing information from the 
satellites, but rather must more actively seek out targets on its own.  F-15#1 is the first F-
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15 to deploy from the Blue base and it is able to relay this information on to the rest of 
the squadron, which rely on both the satellites’ and F-15#1’s detection information to 
guide them to targets.  This may be why F-15#1’s average detection distance undergoes 
this change for the terrain only case while F-15#1’s average detection distance, as well as 
that of the squadron as a whole, are not significantly different.  In summary of the data 
analysis presented in Tables 1 and 2, terrain and weather effects are seen to significantly 
affect the NCW physical domain metric of detection distance for the satellites in the 
Kosovo scenario, but not for the F-15’s.  Due to their respective coding in the warfile as 
to how the terrain and weather affects each platform, this is the expected outcome. 
Table 3.  JSTARS and Global Hawk Paired-t Test Detection Distance Analysis 
JSTARS
Difference Between 
Baseline and:
95 % Confidence 
Interval
Statistical 
Difference?
Percentage Change 
from Baseline:
Full Effects 0.21 (-2.09, 2.51) No -0.33
Terrain Only 0.28 (-2.48, 3.05) No -0.44
Weather Only -0.63 (-3.05, 1.79) No 0.98
Global Hawk
Difference Between 
Baseline and:
95 % Confidence 
Interval
Statistical 
Difference?
Percentage Change 
from Baseline:
Full Effects -0.06 (-0.18, 0.05) No 0.24
Terrain Only -0.06 (-0.12, 0.00) No 0.24
Weather Only 0.13 (0.03, 0.23) Yes -0.53
( )Z n
( )Z n
 
 
 Similar paired-t confidence interval analysis was also performed for the JSTARS 
and GlobalHawk agents.  Table 3 summarizes the results of this analysis.  The results in 
Table 3 show that in five case comparisons out of six for the JSTARS and GlobalHawk, 
there were no statistically significant differences in the average detection distances for 
each platform.  In the comparison for the GlobalHawk in the case of baseline versus 
weather only effects, even though this change was statistically significant according to 
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the paired-t confidence interval, the percentage decrease in average detection distance of 
0.53 percent is arguably not practically significant.  The lack of statistically significant 
differences across the case comparisons for the average detection distances of the 
JSTARS and GlobalHawk is an unexpected result.  Both platforms exhibit higher degrees 
of sensing activity in all scenarios over all four cases than any other platform. 
 The JSTARS is coded as being affected by the terrain TAO only, so the lack of 
difference in performance for the weather effects only case is understandable.  However, 
it would stand to reason that an observable difference in sensor detection distance range 
would be seen for the full effects and terrain only cases.  It is not clear why the expected 
differences in output are not observed.  The same holds true for the GlobalHawk, 
especially in light of the fact that this platform is coded as being affected by both the 
terrain and the weather TAO.  And yet, there is no statistical decrease of sensor distance 
range for any of the three case comparisons for this platform, except for the weather only 
case whose increase in range, while very unexpected, is not of a magnitude to be 
considered practically significant. 
 One possible conclusion that can be drawn from this lack of statistically 
significant difference for the JSTARS and GlobalHawk is that average detection distance 
may not be a reliable metric within SEAS by which to measure the physical domain for 
sensing platforms other than satellites.  Apparently, the degradation effects of the weather 
and terrain TAO are having significant affects for the long-range sensing activities of the 
satellites but not for the relatively closer range detections of the JSTARS and 
GlobalHawk. 
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4.4 Information Domain Analysis 
 4.4.1 Preliminary Multiple Run Analysis 
 The metric selected for the information domain in the Kosovo scenario was a 
performance measurement of the networks’ communication channels.  Specifically, the 
number of messages handled by each channel was analyzed for key platforms of the Blue 
Force.  The focus was on determining the affect of regional TAO degradation on each 
channels’ ability to handle and transfer messages pertaining to target detections, agent 
orders, and a few variable types of messages.  All three types of messages are tracked in 
SEAS for each channel specified in the TPL and designated in the communications 
output file as the channel name followed by _Sit_, for situation report (i.e. target 
sighting), _Var_, for broadcast variables (which can be various message types such as 
target priority arrays), and _Ord_, for orders and command messages. 
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Figure 19.  AOC Communication with Group & Air Assets (DeStefano, 2004:3-10) 
 
 Figure 19 is a graphic illustration of the Blue Force communications network 
from DeStefano’s work.  The figure shows that the TAC_Air_ORD(6,3) and 
TAC_Air_Ord(1,1) communications lines provide a critical link between the AOC and 
several key Blue platforms, including the F-15 squadron, F-16 squadron, and 
Blu_Cruiser, which is a Navy carrier agent that launches the TOMAHAWK Land Attack 
Missile (TLAM).  Analysis of message loading and activity across all channels 
conducted for this thesis effort confirms that the TAC_Air communication device’s 
primarily used channel, TacAirQ_Sit, is one of the most highly active channels in the 
scenario.  It relays target sightings to the aforementioned platforms. 
 As a first look in trying to appropriately measure the communications output data 
for individual channel loading, one run of the scenario was analyzed to look at both the 
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one-run total number of messages and the average number of messages handled by each 
channel per one minute time-step.  Table 4 shows the results of this preliminary analysis.   
Only the data for number of messages removed from each respective channel is listed in 
the table since this value is most indicative of the activity on the channel and the message 
loading for each channel.  It is identical to the output data for the number of messages 
added to each channel.  The number of messages currently on a channel is tracked by 
SEAS, but this metric is not used because the amount of time that each channel 
broadcasts a batch of messages varies according to its delay time attribute.  Therefore, 
channels having a longer programmed delay time would show higher average total 
message counts and average messages per time-step counts than agents with shorter 
broadcast times and unequal channel performance comparisons would be made.  Using 
the number of messages removed from each channel levels the playing field and works to 
normalize the data for each channel.  
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Table 4.  All Active Communication Channels Analysis 
COMPARISON OF ALL ACTIVE CHANNELS' TOTAL MESSAGE COUNT AND  
AVERAGE MESSAGE COUNT PER MINUTE TIME-STEP FOR ONE RUN
BASELINE - No Effects Full Effects BASELINE minus Full Effects
Channel Count Average Count Average Count Diff Average Diff
JSTARSQ_Sit_Rem 2262.00 0.51 3728.00 0.61 (1466.00) (0.10)
GShipQ_Sit_Rem 1985.00 0.43 424.00 0.10 1561.00 0.33
GHQ_Sit_Rem 3362.00 0.68 833.00 0.15 2529.00 0.53
SBRQ_Sit_Rem 22302.00 4.90 18781.00 3.23 3521.00 1.67
TacAirQ_Sit_Rem 22302.00 4.90 18781.00 3.23 3521.00 1.67
GShip_OrdQ_Ord_Rem 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Air_OrdQ_Ord_Rem 3.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ImSatQ_Sit_Rem 64.00 0.01 14.00 0.00 50.00 0.01
ElintSATQ_Sit_Rem 233.00 0.06 216.00 0.06 17.00 0.00
SOF_OrdQ_Ord_Rem 342.00 0.21 207.00 0.13 135.00 0.09
SOF_Sat_PhQ_Sit_Rem 336.00 0.05 311.00 0.06 25.00 (0.01)
RTac_OrdQ_Var_Rem 11342.00 2.14 11342.00 2.12 0.00 0.03
RTac_OrdQ_Ord_Rem 11198.00 1.93 11578.00 1.99 (380.00) (0.06)
RIADSQ_Sit_Rem 827.00 0.18 1205.00 0.25 (378.00) (0.06)
RSRTQ3_Sit_Rem 371.00 0.20 353.00 0.20 18.00 0.00
KSHQ_Sit_Rem 218.00 0.04 237.00 0.04 (19.00) 0.00
KSHQ_Ord_Rem 283.00 0.05 249.00 0.05 34.00 0.00
KBellQ_Sit_Rem 3652.00 0.45 6742.00 0.78 (3090.00) (0.33)
KBellQ_Ord_Rem 24.00 0.00 24.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Terrain Only BASELINE minus Terrain Only
Count Average Count Diff Average Diff
JSTARSQ_Sit_Rem 2260.00 0.46 2.00 0.05
GShipQ_Sit_Rem 1800.00 0.34 185.00 0.09
GHQ_Sit_Rem 3197.00 0.56 165.00 0.12
SBRQ_Sit_Rem 21321.00 4.11 981.00 0.79
TacAirQ_Sit_Rem 21321.00 4.11 981.00 0.79
GShip_OrdQ_Ord_Rem 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Air_OrdQ_Ord_Rem 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ImSatQ_Sit_Rem 21.00 0.01 43.00 0.01
ElintSATQ_Sit_Rem 205.00 0.04 28.00 0.02
SOF_OrdQ_Ord_Rem 567.00 0.13 (225.00) 0.08
SOF_Sat_PhQ_Sit_Rem 131.00 0.04 205.00 0.01
RTac_OrdQ_Var_Rem 13448.00 2.26 (2106.00) (0.12)
RTac_OrdQ_Ord_Rem 7138.00 1.73 4060.00 0.20
RIADSQ_Sit_Rem 1250.00 0.20 (423.00) (0.01)
RSRTQ3_Sit_Rem 367.00 0.09 4.00 0.10
KSHQ_Sit_Rem 303.00 0.04 (85.00) 0.00
KSHQ_Ord_Rem 310.00 0.05 (27.00) 0.00
KBellQ_Sit_Rem 3635.00 0.42 17.00 0.03
KBellQ_Ord_Rem 24.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Weather Only BASELINE minus Weather Only
Count Average Count Diff Average Diff
JSTARSQ_Sit_Rem 1077.00 0.48 1185.00 0.04
GShipQ_Sit_Rem 131.00 0.09 1854.00 0.33
GHQ_Sit_Rem 180.00 0.16 3182.00 0.53
SBRQ_Sit_Rem 5328.00 2.65 16974.00 2.26
TacAirQ_Sit_Rem 5328.00 2.65 16974.00 2.26
GShip_OrdQ_Ord_Rem 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Air_OrdQ_Ord_Rem 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ImSatQ_Sit_Rem 27.00 0.01 37.00 0.01
ElintSATQ_Sit_Rem 172.00 0.04 61.00 0.01
SOF_OrdQ_Ord_Rem 189.00 0.08 153.00 0.13
SOF_Sat_PhQ_Sit_Rem 512.00 0.05 (176.00) 0.00
RTac_OrdQ_Var_Rem 13367.00 2.19 (2025.00) (0.05)
RTac_OrdQ_Ord_Rem 7118.00 1.86 4080.00 0.07
RIADSQ_Sit_Rem 765.00 0.18 62.00 0.00
RSRTQ3_Sit_Rem 369.00 0.11 2.00 0.09
KSHQ_Sit_Rem 264.00 0.04 (46.00) 0.00
KSHQ_Ord_Rem 256.00 0.05 27.00 0.00
KBellQ_Sit_Rem 9828.00 0.62 (6176.00) (0.17)
KBellQ_Ord_Rem 24.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
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 Table 4 gives a good indicator of not only which channels are handling the 
highest message loads, but also provides a good illustration of which channels are most 
affected by the degradation effects.  Values which are bold and listed in parenthesis 
represent negative values and therefore, these are the cases and channels which yielded 
higher levels of either total message count and/or average message count per one minute 
time-step and therefore actually saw higher activity for that respective degraded case and 
channel combination relative to the baseline case performance. 
 Channels of interest which saw this increase in activity for both total message 
count and average message count for at least one case versus the baseline are shaded 
since these channels exhibit unexpected behavior for the degraded cases.  These six 
channels of interest are JSTARSQ_Sit, RTac_OrdQ_Ord, RIADSQ_Sit, RSRTQ3_Sit, 
KSHQ_Ord, and KBellQ_Sit.  JSTARSQ_Sit is a channel that relays target sighting 
information from the JSTARS agent.  RTac_OrdQ_Ord carries orders for the Red Force.  
RIADSQ_Sit is a channel used by the RedIADSnet device, which is held by the 
RedSA61Tel, RedSA62Tel, RedSA61RadarVan, and RedSA62RadarVan vehicles.  
KSHQ_Ord and KBellQ_Sit are used by the Brown Kosovar agents as distress emitting 
“channels” on which to shout commands to each other and ring bells to signal attack by 
the Red Serbian Force.  Of these six channels of interest based on their communications 
data improvements in the degraded cases, only JSTARSQ_Sit is of particular interest 
since this is a highly active channel of the Blue Force and since it is used by a vehicle, 
the JSTARS, that is affected by the terrain TAO, whereas the Red and Brown forces are 
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not affected by either the terrain or the weather TAO.  Thus, of these six channels, only 
JSTARSQ_Sit warrants further analysis. 
 4.4.2 Average Message Loading of Active Channels 
 The problem with the foregoing analysis method for the communications data is 
that the zero values for time-steps when no messages are removed from a channel tend to 
distort the calculated averages.  The legitimacy of this analysis technique is also 
weakened by the fact that the output data stream from a single run is not independent.  A 
closer look and more intensive analysis approach is required in order to determine the 
values for a more appropriate measure, which would be the average message load 
handled by each channel only during the times when that channel is holding a batch of 
messages.  Once again, the number of messages removed field from the standard SEAS 
communication output file will be utilized.  The preliminary analysis conducted over all 
time-steps for one replication was used as a guide for determining the communication 
channels to focus on for analysis of average channel load only when that channel is 
active.  Only the baseline case and full effects case were analyzed for the sake of 
comparison due to the considerable amount of time required to extract the desired 
information from the SEAS raw data communication output files.  Table 5 presents 
average active channel usage data for the top five most active channels in the Kosovo 
model. 
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Table 5.  Average Active Channel Usage for One Simulation Run 
BASELINE - NO EFFECTS CASE
Channel JSTARSQ_Sit SBRQ_Sit TacAirQ_Sit RTac_OrdQ_Var RTac_OrdQ_Ord
Number of Active Minute 
Time-Steps 196.00 324.00 179.00 513.00 1132.00
Average Message per 
Active Time-Step 7.18 64.82 117.34 27.16 14.77
FULL EFFECTS CASE
Channel JSTARSQ_Sit SBRQ_Sit TacAirQ_Sit RTac_OrdQ_Var RTac_OrdQ_Ord
Number of Active Minute 
Time-Steps 352.00 293.00 187.00 525.00 882.00
Average Message per 
Active Time-Step 10.43 58.02 90.91 23.60 14.88  
 This table shows mixed results as far as the usefulness of the average active time-
step measure.  The JSTARSQ_Sit channel has already been discussed.  The SBRQ_Sit is 
one of the primary channels used by the CAOC to relay target sighting information.  The 
TacAirQ_Sit has also been previously discussed.  RTac_OrdQ_Var and RTac_OrdQ_Ord 
are command channels used by the Red Force to relay various types of orders 
information to the Red units and vehicles. 
 There seems to be no clear or consistent pattern of either decrease or increase for 
the average number of active time-steps across these channels and cases.  The average 
number of messages per active time-step measure seems to be more indicative of a real 
trend, in that three out of five channels show a drop in average active usage from the 
baseline case to the full effects case.  A decrease in message load for the full effects case 
is the expected result, especially for the Blue Force channels of JSTARSQ_Sit, SBRQ_Sit, 
and TacAirQ_Sit.  JSTARSQ_Sit activity should decrease due to a reduced number of 
target sightings because of the terrain effect that the JSTARS agent is coded as being 
affected by.  However, this is not the case, as the activity on JSTARSQ_Sit actually 
increases for the full effects case.  The message load per time-step of SBRQ_Sit and 
 65
TacAirQ_Sit decreases for the full effects case, as would be expected since the CAOC 
should have less target sighting messages to relay, especially from the satellites since 
their target detection frequency and range was significantly affected by the weather and 
terrain effects.  RTac_OrdQ_Var sees a decrease, from 27.16 to 23.60, in average 
message load per active time-step, as might be expected since the Red Force behaves 
largely in a reactive way to Blue Force’s activities.  The presence of full degradation 
effects tends to reduce the overall activity of Blue and consequently tends to reduce the 
reactionary activity of Red.  RTac_OrdQ_Ord carries a slightly higher number of average 
messages per active time-step for the full effects case, but the increase is less than one 
percent (from 14.77 to 14.88, a 0.74% increase) and therefore arguably not practically 
significant. 
 4.4.3 Average Message Loading Over Time 
 A final approach taken to determine an appropriate and usable information 
domain metric which can be gleaned from the SEAS communication output data involves 
plotting the overall average message load for the top four active channels over ten ten-
hour segments of one simulation run.  The resulting plots are illustrated in Figure 20 and 
21.  The average number of messages per ten-hour time block is calculated over all 60 
minute time-steps for the baseline and full effects cases using the same starting random 
number seed.  There was no adjustment made to filter out time-steps when the channels 
are broadcasting zero messages.  Four out of five of the communications channels 
selected for the previous phase of analysis are presented in these plots.  SBRQ_Sit was 
excluded on these plots because this channel’s average message activity per ten-hour 
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time segment is exactly the same as the TacAirQ_Sit channel’s average number of 
messages and this holds true for both the baseline case and full effects case. 
Baseline (No Effects) Case - Average Message Load per
10 Hours of Kosovo Scenario for Top Four Active Channels
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Figure 20.  Baseline Case Average Message Load per 10-hour Segment 
 
Full Effects Case - Average Message Load per 10 Hours
of Kosovo Scenario for Top Four Active Channels
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Figure 21.  Full Effects Case Average Message Load per 10-hour Segment 
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 A few trends can be seen in the average communication loading for these top four 
active channels.  A pattern of relatively high message activity on TacAirQ_Sit for 
approximately the first 20 hours, then decrease up until approximately 50 hours, followed 
by a rise until about the 70 hour mark and fall after that, holds true for both cases.  These 
two distinct phases of communication activity match up closely with DeStefano’s 
findings concerning phases of war for the Kosovo scenario.  Figure 22 illustrates these 
two phases in terms of number of kills. 
 
Figure 22.  Two Phases of the Kosovo War Based on Kill Data (DeStefano, 2004:4-3) 
 
 Phase I, origin of the war to approximately 48 hours, is considered a SEAD phase.  
Phase II, from approximately 48 hours on, is considered as intervention of killing on the 
ground.  This phase is highlighted by a large distribution of Kosovar kills as opposed to 
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other activities occurring during this time (DeStefano, 2004:4-2).  The plots for both 
cases portraying the average number of messages per ten-hour segment match up nicely 
with these two phases of war and the generally lower number of messages on 
TacAirQ_Sit for the full effects case matches the expected outcome for this degraded 
case. 
 The trends are not quite as easy to observe for data on the Red channels, 
RTac_OrdQ_Var and RTac_OrdQ_Ord.  RTac_OrdQ_Var follows a similar nearly flat-
line pattern in both cases and generally holds a slightly lower number of average 
messages per ten-hour segment (ranges from 0.18 to 0.83 for ten-hour segments where 
the no effects average is greater than the full effects average).  RTac_OrdQ_Ord follows 
essentially the same exact progression of values for each case over the first 
approximately 50 hours, but after that the average number of messages on this channel 
for the full effects case shoots up to nearly twice the amount as seen in the no effects 
baseline.  The general trend of RTac_OrdQ_Ord’s message activity for both cases seems 
to match the two-phase pattern seen by DeStefano’s kill data analysis and by the message 
activity line plotted in each case for TacAirQ_Sit. 
 Activity for JSTARSQ_Sit for both cases also roughly matches the two-phases of 
war trend.  However, the average message load on JSTARSQ_Sit again appears to 
increase for the full effects case, which again is an unexpected given that the JSTARS is 
coded as being affected by the terrain TAO.  Terrain effects should result in a drop of the 
communications reliability and hence a lower number of average messages being relayed, 
but this is not what the output data is showing.  Just as was the case in the detection 
 69
distance analysis for the JSTARS, it is unclear as to why this platform is performing better 
in the degraded cases. 
4.5 Cognitive Domain Analysis 
 The chosen measure for the cognitive domain of NCW is the somewhat indirect 
metric of number of kills (and, consequently, number of victim deaths) per platform.  Kill 
data is representative of decision-making behavior because the recording of a kill in the 
scenario is conclusive evidence of the outcome resulting from a decision made to attack.  
The kill numbers measure the “act” part of the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) 
loop.  Unlike the physical and information domain metrics, the outputs for kill numbers 
used to measure the cognitive domain of NCW are relatively clear and definitive.  This 
section illustrates that, in general, the no degradation effects (baseline) case is the best 
case scenario for the Blue USAFE Force both in terms of higher number of Red killed 
and lower number of Brown killed. 
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Figure 23.  Kill Counts for Blue’s Most Active Weapons for All Four Cases 
 
 Figure 23 shows the cumulative number of kills over thirty runs for Blue’s most 
active weapons.  The numbers for the Gunship#4.Aircanon105 weapon exhibit a 
considerable effect of the degradation states on the final outcome of this agent’s mission 
success in terms of enemy agents killed.  The Blu_Cruiser#5.TLAM weapon also exhibits 
the trend of higher kills for the baseline case versus the three degraded cases.  The 
cumulative kill numbers for the F-15s’ JSOW weapons, however, in general do not show 
the same clear trends. 
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Figure 24.  Blue F-15 and Red Tel Victim Counts for All Four Cases 
 
 Figure 24 shows the cumulative victim count over thirty runs of each case for the 
Blue F-15’s and Red SA6 Tels.  Similar positive trends for the Blue Force are seen in this 
victims plot as were seen in Figure 23.  Generally less Blue agents are killed in the no 
effects baseline case as compared to the full effects case (except for in the case of 
F15_SEADSqdn#5.F15E#6).  The results for F-15 losses are mixed when comparing the 
baseline case with the terrain only and weather only cases.  Red, meanwhile, has higher 
losses across all Red SA6 Tels in the no effects case versus the baseline case.  Similar to 
the F-15 losses, the results for Red SA6 Tel losses are mixed when comparing the 
baseline case with the terrain only and weather only cases. 
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Figure 25.  Number of Kosovars Killed in All Four Cases 
 
 The number of Kosovars killed over the various effects cases is shown in Figure 
25.  This plot also shows positive trends for the Blue USAFE Force, whose mission is to 
protect the Brown Kosovar Force agents and minimize the number of Kosovars killed.  It 
can be clearly seen from the various kill labels that, in general, less Kosovar agents are 
dying in the no effects baseline case as opposed to the three degrading effects cases. 
 Cumulative kill counts over 30 runs offer rough insight into behavior and 
performance within the Kosovo scenario over the four degraded cases.  However, to gain 
deeper insight into the true behavior, a paired-t confidence interval approach will once 
again be utilized.  The procedure used here is similar to the one used for average 
detection distance analysis, but this time jX  represents total kills per platform for the 
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baseline case and jY  represents total kills per platform for the degraded cases.  Results of 
the paired-t confidence interval analysis are presented in Table 6.  The full paired-t test 
results and analysis are listed in Appendix A.  On average over thirty runs, Blue kills 
more Red SA Tels and Radar Vans in the degraded cases, but a statistically significant 
difference is not found at a 95% confidence level.  Each degraded case resulted in higher 
losses for the number of Kosovar houses destroyed by Red.  While no statistically 
significant difference is seen for the terrain and weather only comparisons, the difference 
was statistically significant at a 95% confidence level for the full effects versus baseline 
comparison.  This result leads to the conclusion that Blue is more successful at achieving 
its mission of saving Kosovars when its network capability of sensing and 
communicating is not fully degraded. 
Table 6.  Paired-t Test Results for Red and Brown Victim Counts Over Thirty Runs 
                Blue Kills of Red SA Tels and Radar Vans
Difference Between 
Baseline and:
95 % Confidence 
Interval
Statistical 
Difference?
Full Effects 1.37 (-0.32, 3.05) No
Terrain Only 0.13 (-1.22, 1.48) No
Weather Only 0.83 (-0.88, 2.54) No
                      Kosovar Houses Destroyed by Red
Difference Between 
Baseline and:
95 % Confidence 
Interval
Statistical 
Difference?
Full Effects -2.20 (-4.33, -0.07) Yes
Terrain Only -0.40 (-1.50, 0.70) No
Weather Only -0.43 (-1.75, 0.88) No
( )Z n
( )Z n
 
4.6 Summary 
 The analysis presented in this chapter demonstrates that the task of developing 
appropriate measures for NCW within the context of a SEAS model can be quite 
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challenging.  This analysis also illustrates that determining whether a particular metric is 
fundamental enough to serve as a useful measure for the degree, or performance, of NCW 
is not a very clear-cut proposition.  Average sensor detection distance seemed to be a 
fitting and effective measure of performance in the physical domain for the satellites in 
the Kosovo scenario, but didn’t seem as applicable for measuring the performance of 
other agents, such as the JSTARS and GlobalHawk.  Analysis of the information domain 
provided different approaches and ways of looking at the average number of messages 
being handled by the network for various communication channels.  The metric of 
average channel message load seemed to be a suitable measure for some channels, such 
as for TacAirQ_Sit, but not as suitable a measure of performance for other channels, such 
as JSTARSQ_Sit.  Utilization of Killer Victim Scoreboard (KVS) information for 
measuring outcomes pertaining to the cognitive domain seemed to be the most consistent 
and reliable measure, as compared with the measures for the physical and information 
domains.  Positive trends for the Blue Force were seen in comparing the case of no 
degradation effects to those three cases employing effects that would degrade 
performance of the sensors and communication devices.  In the no effects case as 
compared with the three cases of varying degradation, Blue killed more Red and spared 
more Brown agents.  An increase of Kosovar houses killed in the full effects degradation 
case was found to be statistically significant. 
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V. Conclusions 
 
5.1 Overview 
 This research utilized a SEAS scenario representative of the Kosovo conflict 
during 1999 to simulate the performance of an NCW enabled force and to provide an 
investigative framework from which to identify appropriate measures of NCW that are 
available from the SEAS software.  The methodology for determining appropriate NCW 
measures was conducted by means of implementing effects within the Kosovo scenario 
which degraded the sensing and communications ability of the Blue Force.   This chapter 
presents a summary of the conclusions drawn from statistical output analysis conducted 
for measures of the three domains of NCW for a baseline case of the Kosovo scenario 
with no degradation effects versus three cases possessing varying levels of degradation 
effects.  Following a description of conclusions drawn from analysis, recommendations 
for improvement of SEAS software and the SEAS Post Processor are addressed.  This 
chapter concludes with several suggestions for future research. 
5.2 Analysis Conclusions and Limitations 
 In general, the physical domain measure of average detection distance was found 
to be an appropriate measure for the Blue Force satellites in the Kosovo scenario, but not 
for other agents affected by the degradation effects, namely the JSTARS and 
GlobalHawk.  The analysis was somewhat limited by the fact that determining the 
number of detections for various platforms was very challenging and intensive, especially 
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when dealing with the considerably large sensor detection output files from 30 runs of the 
scenario. 
 For the information domain, measuring various averages of communication 
channel loading for single run as well as for multiple runs provided some insight into the 
affect of degradation on the active communications channels in the Kosovo scenario.  
Message count data for all channels in the Kosovo scenario was analyzed from three 
different perspectives: total count and average message load numbers for eleven runs of 
the scenario, total count and average active message load for all channels handling 
messages in the scenario (some channels saw no activity), and average message loading 
for the top four active channels plotted according to ten ten-hour segments of one 
simulation run.  Encouraging trends were observed from analysis of the average message 
loading measure, such as a reduction in the average message activity for Blue’s primary 
channel, TacAirQ_Sit, from the baseline no degradation effects case to the full 
degradation effects.  Also, message loads for the top four active channels in the scenario 
were seen to approximately match the two phases of war pattern, phases which were 
initially discovered by Destefano in his analysis of kill data for one run of the Kosovo 
scenario.  Analysis of the JSTARS target sighting channel showed an unexpected increase 
in average message load for the degraded case, which slightly undermined the legitimacy 
of the chosen technique for measuring communication channel performance.  However, 
this unexpected result may be unique to the JSTARS platform in this scenario and does 
not necessarily totally invalidate the technique. 
 The most compelling results were seen in analysis of kill data for the cognitive 
domain.  Both number of kills and number of victims for the Blue, Red, and Brown 
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forces were analyzed in order to determine what affect the various degradation states 
would have on the attrition numbers.  Clear trends were seen portraying fewer kills for 
Blue and higher losses for Brown in the degraded cases versus the baseline case, all of 
which were compelling because these are the results that one would logically expect to 
observe given the primary role played by sensors and communications devices in the 
scenario.  These killer and victim outcomes give a fair representation of Blue’s reliance 
on the network and show how Blue’s performance suffers when the network capability is 
reduced. 
5.3 Recommendations for SEAS Improvement 
 The Excel-based SEAS Post Processor is a very useful tool for processing, 
filtering, and graphically representing various types of output data created by a typical 
SEAS scenario.  However, several problems and limitations were encountered over the 
course of analysis for this effort, especially when analyzing output data for the various 
communications channels in the Kosovo scenario.  The standard plots for output data for 
the various communications channels that were available from the SEAS Post Processor 
ultimately proved to be more confusing than they were useful.  There is considerable 
room for improvement as far as the options available for filtering and setting up plots for 
communications data.  Also, the lack of ability to quickly filter and process large data 
files was a major hindrance in using SEAS Post Processor throughout the analysis 
process.  This was especially true for the communications data analysis.  One 
communications data output file from 30 runs of the Kosovo scenario of moderate file 
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size relative to the sensor data output files (typically 70 MB for the communications files 
versus 375 MB for the sensor files) required one hour just to load within Post Processor. 
5.4 Future Research 
 There are several follow-on activities that could be pursued in order to enhance 
and build upon the findings of this research.  The utilization of write statements is a 
SEAS coding technique which offers great promise and potential in its ability to extract 
specific pieces of data.  Employing write statements, either in the Kosovo scenario or in 
another SEAS scenario which adequately represents NCW, could potentially provide a 
powerful aid in helping to filter and isolate appropriate NCW measures, especially in the 
information and cognitive domains.  A few measures which write statements may be able 
to capture include tracking the overall cycle time required to detect and neutralize a 
target and tracking the number of target sighting messages from a specific key sensor that 
are being relayed to a certain weapons platform. 
 Another research methodology that could prove to be a useful approach in finding 
appropriate measures for NCW is an analysis of the outcomes resulting from changing 
the degree of information sharing by varying the message cueing attribute for key agents 
in a scenario.  Measures of performance could be analyzed relative to the extent to which 
agents in the scenario are sharing information. 
 Network Centric Warfare is a continually evolving concept.  Research and 
analysis of appropriate measures is likely to be an ongoing activity for as long as the 
DoD includes NCW as part of its military doctrine and strategy.  Continued pursuit of 
understanding NCW and how to appropriately measure it through use of combat models, 
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simulations, case studies, and lessons learned from practical experience will definitely 
continue to benefit our forces and improve their current and future efficiency of 
operations in the brave new network-centric environment. 
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Appendix A.  Paired-t Tests Data 
 
Average Detection Distances for All Four Cases
Blue.USAFEUROPE.Sat1#1.B_Sat_EO_Sensor
Run # No Effects Full Effects Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 1280.99 1142.02 138.97 178.30 1546.99 34.10
2.00 1292.78 1082.57 210.21 1018.32
3.00 1273.93 1079.37 194.56 264.39
4.00 1267.11 1079.11 188.01 94.21
5.00 1279.05 1100.92 178.13 0.03
6.00 1251.16 1081.55 169.60 75.65
7.00 1287.16 1079.83 207.33 842.70
8.00 1301.90 1081.38 220.52 1782.26
9.00 1280.85 1127.17 153.68 606.04
10.00 1263.23 1060.65 202.58 589.34
11.00 1279.33 1096.14 183.18 23.83
12.00 1259.03 1058.44 200.59 496.92
13.00 1258.70 1193.13 65.57 12708.24
14.00 1272.67 1100.41 172.26 36.52
15.00 1283.93 1063.20 220.73 1800.48
16.00 1283.66 1089.07 194.58 265.10
17.00 1293.64 1084.06 209.59 978.68
18.00 1306.99 1100.33 206.66 804.24
19.00 1240.94 1078.05 162.89 237.57
20.00 1271.79 1094.98 176.80 2.25
21.00 1256.79 1074.53 182.26 15.68
22.00 1239.56 1116.96 122.60 3102.49
23.00 1269.47 1089.76 179.71 2.00
24.00 1242.06 1079.51 162.54 248.32
25.00 1248.26 1072.57 175.69 6.81
26.00 1234.35 1094.47 139.88 1476.12
27.00 1257.66 1082.29 175.37 8.60
28.00 1279.42 1095.58 183.84 30.67
29.00 1287.80 1086.57 201.23 525.73
30.00 1245.50 1076.04 169.46 78.20
Averages: 1269.66 1091.35 SUM= 29668.35
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = 166.38 190.23  
Blue.USAFEUROPE.Sat1#1.B_Sat_EO_Sensor
Run # No Effects Terrain Only Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 1280.99 1091.97 189.02 174.57 208.84 18.10
2.00 1292.78 1099.63 193.15 345.37
3.00 1273.93 1088.26 185.67 123.31
4.00 1267.11 1084.00 183.12 73.11
5.00 1279.05 1089.57 189.48 222.22
6.00 1251.16 1084.54 166.62 63.25
7.00 1287.16 1096.40 190.75 261.93
8.00 1301.90 1104.75 197.15 510.06
9.00 1280.85 1064.16 216.69 1774.24
10.00 1263.23 1104.90 158.33 263.59
11.00 1279.33 1129.70 149.63 622.01
12.00 1259.03 1081.26 177.77 10.23
13.00 1258.70 1099.59 159.11 238.96
14.00 1272.67 1084.30 188.37 190.54
15.00 1283.93 1084.59 199.34 613.62
16.00 1283.66 1153.34 130.32 1958.17
17.00 1293.64 1105.61 188.03 181.17
18.00 1306.99 1101.26 205.73 971.22
19.00 1240.94 1105.64 135.30 1542.18
20.00 1271.79 1081.27 190.52 254.42
21.00 1256.79 1080.51 176.27 2.91
22.00 1239.56 1076.77 162.79 138.64
23.00 1269.47 1072.20 197.27 515.19
24.00 1242.06 1091.44 150.61 573.84
25.00 1248.26 1118.63 129.63 2019.49
26.00 1234.35 1083.18 151.16 547.74
27.00 1257.66 1096.35 161.31 175.91
28.00 1279.42 1089.36 190.06 239.84
29.00 1287.80 1106.07 181.73 51.34
30.00 1245.50 1103.37 142.12 1052.82
Averages: 1269.66 1095.09 SUM= 15746.15
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = 165.88 183.26  
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Blue.USAFEUROPE.Sat1#1.B_Sat_EO_Sensor
Run # No Effects Weather Only Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 1290.71 1252.02 38.69 26.04 160.08 34.22
2.00 1259.56 1264.03 -4.47 930.46
3.00 1274.63 1240.71 33.92 62.18
4.00 1265.26 1281.97 -16.71 1827.56
5.00 1283.17 1275.78 7.39 347.56
6.00 1289.71 1280.87 8.84 295.54
7.00 1307.49 1269.97 37.51 131.71
8.00 1236.81 1204.33 32.48 41.51
9.00 1289.30 1290.37 -1.07 734.82
10.00 1248.63 1293.53 -44.91 5033.03
11.00 1285.04 1212.83 72.21 2131.69
12.00 1262.96 1245.39 17.57 71.67
13.00 1295.55 1305.71 -10.15 1309.78
14.00 1294.60 1231.13 63.47 1401.65
15.00 1290.07 1238.28 51.79 663.42
16.00 1285.23 1233.14 52.10 679.08
17.00 1248.79 1253.39 -4.60 938.28
18.00 1307.33 1229.46 77.88 2687.30
19.00 1261.66 1259.42 2.24 566.23
20.00 1284.45 1264.55 19.90 37.63
21.00 1302.29 1247.59 54.70 821.55
22.00 1284.47 1253.73 30.75 22.19
23.00 1266.88 1273.06 -6.18 1037.72
24.00 1297.42 1209.93 87.49 3776.14
25.00 1278.43 1242.08 36.35 106.44
26.00 1250.15 1185.01 65.15 1529.54
27.00 1302.10 1242.26 59.84 1142.77
28.00 1272.96 1258.05 14.91 123.87
29.00 1304.11 1300.17 3.94 488.31
30.00 1273.82 1273.76 0.06 674.85
Averages: 1279.79 1253.75 SUM= 29774.55
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = 14.09 37.98  
 
Average Detection Distances for All Four Cases
Blue.USAFEUROPE.Sat1#2.B_Sat_EO_Sensor
Run # No Effects Full Effects Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 1290.71 1123.98 166.73 176.66 98.65 38.32
2.00 1259.56 1098.34 161.22 238.32
3.00 1274.63 1098.70 175.93 0.53
4.00 1265.26 1093.18 172.08 21.01
5.00 1283.17 1157.54 125.63 2603.62
6.00 1289.71 1098.62 191.09 208.29
7.00 1307.49 1062.81 244.68 4626.72
8.00 1236.81 1073.21 163.60 170.58
9.00 1289.30 1150.40 138.90 1425.72
10.00 1248.63 1084.07 164.55 146.54
11.00 1285.04 1082.16 202.88 687.35
12.00 1262.96 1095.78 167.18 89.86
13.00 1295.55 1092.53 203.03 695.28
14.00 1294.60 1059.00 235.60 3473.76
15.00 1290.07 1148.79 141.28 1251.83
16.00 1285.23 1122.49 162.74 193.62
17.00 1248.79 1118.79 130.01 2176.36
18.00 1307.33 1076.14 231.19 2973.66
19.00 1261.66 1089.62 172.04 21.32
20.00 1284.45 1147.29 137.16 1560.14
21.00 1302.29 1114.84 187.45 116.44
22.00 1284.47 1121.36 163.11 183.55
23.00 1266.88 1103.40 163.48 173.71
24.00 1297.42 1056.31 241.11 4153.54
25.00 1278.43 1130.26 148.18 811.20
26.00 1250.15 1114.63 135.52 1692.16
27.00 1302.10 1099.39 202.71 678.78
28.00 1272.96 1086.69 186.27 92.31
29.00 1304.11 1078.06 226.05 2439.85
30.00 1273.82 1115.44 158.37 334.31
Averages: 1279.79 1103.13 SUM= 33339.02
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = 164.02 189.30  
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Blue.USAFEUROPE.Sat1#2.B_Sat_EO_Sensor
Run # No Effects Terrain Only Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 1290.71 1098.29 192.42 164.00 807.62 20.96
2.00 1259.56 1108.86 150.71 176.69
3.00 1274.63 1110.91 163.73 0.07
4.00 1265.26 1078.71 186.55 508.36
5.00 1283.17 1111.50 171.67 58.91
6.00 1289.71 1122.67 167.04 9.27
7.00 1307.49 1125.85 181.63 311.04
8.00 1236.81 1116.70 120.11 1925.89
9.00 1289.30 1110.70 178.60 213.28
10.00 1248.63 1129.70 118.92 2031.76
11.00 1285.04 1131.82 153.22 116.13
12.00 1262.96 1128.44 134.52 869.20
13.00 1295.55 1113.66 181.89 320.01
14.00 1294.60 1135.69 158.92 25.84
15.00 1290.07 1122.06 168.01 16.12
16.00 1285.23 1179.46 105.77 3390.04
17.00 1248.79 1110.12 138.67 641.39
18.00 1307.33 1130.70 176.63 159.65
19.00 1261.66 1100.54 161.11 8.32
20.00 1284.45 1111.35 173.10 82.86
21.00 1302.29 1100.54 201.75 1425.27
22.00 1284.47 1103.09 181.38 302.24
23.00 1266.88 1120.88 146.01 323.73
24.00 1297.42 1118.46 178.96 223.77
25.00 1278.43 1108.97 169.46 29.84
26.00 1250.15 1119.14 131.01 1088.16
27.00 1302.10 1092.02 210.08 2123.52
28.00 1272.96 1093.85 179.11 228.44
29.00 1304.11 1115.12 188.99 624.62
30.00 1273.82 1123.86 149.96 196.97
Averages: 1279.79 1115.79 SUM= 18239.01
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = 154.65 173.35  
 
Blue.USAFEUROPE.Sat1#2.B_Sat_EO_Sensor
Run # No Effects Weather Only Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 1290.71 1229.25 61.46 18.05 1883.83 75.10
2.00 1259.56 1225.54 34.02 254.95
3.00 1274.63 1259.52 15.11 8.64
4.00 1265.26 1360.17 -94.92 12762.03
5.00 1283.17 1286.88 -3.71 473.83
6.00 1289.71 1309.83 -20.11 1456.68
7.00 1307.49 1311.32 -3.84 479.14
8.00 1236.81 1260.68 -23.87 1757.63
9.00 1289.30 1280.22 9.08 80.57
10.00 1248.63 1238.52 10.10 63.24
11.00 1285.04 1178.53 106.51 7824.85
12.00 1262.96 1210.43 52.53 1188.77
13.00 1295.55 1311.74 -16.19 1172.57
14.00 1294.60 1285.56 9.04 81.25
15.00 1290.07 1345.33 -55.26 5374.35
16.00 1285.23 1248.59 36.65 345.65
17.00 1248.79 1202.18 46.62 815.80
18.00 1307.33 1174.49 132.85 13177.17
19.00 1261.66 1305.18 -43.53 3792.04
20.00 1284.45 1270.24 14.21 14.77
21.00 1302.29 1278.56 23.73 32.26
22.00 1284.47 1262.97 21.50 11.89
23.00 1266.88 1238.10 28.78 115.09
24.00 1297.42 1187.21 110.20 8491.51
25.00 1278.43 1254.24 24.19 37.69
26.00 1250.15 1285.82 -35.67 2886.22
27.00 1302.10 1273.19 28.92 118.03
28.00 1272.96 1231.72 41.24 537.64
29.00 1304.11 1281.47 22.64 21.01
30.00 1273.82 1264.50 9.32 76.28
Averages: 1279.79 1261.73 SUM= 65335.36
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = 0.36 35.75  
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Average Detection Distances for All Four Cases
Blue.USAFEUROPE.USAF_CAOC#1.F15_SEADSqdn#5.F15E#1.AC_Elint
Run # No Effects Full Effects Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 46.77 30.96 15.80 -0.44 263.83 7.93
2.00 64.10 59.04 5.07 30.34
3.00 40.17 43.65 -3.48 9.25
4.00 41.88 49.72 -7.84 54.85
5.00 34.35 32.81 1.54 3.91
6.00 36.58 34.35 2.23 7.12
7.00 35.49 44.31 -8.81 70.11
8.00 50.00 21.63 28.37 830.04
9.00 28.67 47.14 -18.47 325.14
10.00 43.63 58.36 -14.73 204.33
11.00 39.27 27.22 12.05 156.05
12.00 40.56 39.81 0.75 1.41
13.00 45.97 43.56 2.41 8.13
14.00 41.97 29.41 12.56 168.88
15.00 46.12 68.89 -22.77 498.63
16.00 39.86 39.95 -0.09 0.12
17.00 54.71 28.01 26.70 736.41
18.00 40.55 33.72 6.83 52.88
19.00 45.78 54.68 -8.90 71.66
20.00 23.86 37.78 -13.92 181.83
21.00 38.13 31.01 7.12 57.08
22.00 48.78 45.49 3.30 13.95
23.00 29.91 50.52 -20.61 406.82
24.00 29.68 33.89 -4.21 14.25
25.00 56.07 59.44 -3.37 8.58
26.00 42.59 61.54 -18.95 342.62
27.00 38.98 36.16 2.82 10.62
28.00 47.54 27.48 20.06 420.28
29.00 41.54 41.54 1762.21
30.00 33.70 47.83 -14.13 187.57
Averages: 41.57 42.01 SUM= 6898.88
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -6.19 5.31  
 
Blue.USAFEUROPE.USAF_CAOC#1.F15_SEADSqdn#5.F15E#1.AC_Elint
Run # No Effects Terrain Only Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 46.77 47.42 -0.66 -6.56 34.89 6.35
2.00 64.10 58.42 5.69 150.04
3.00 40.17 41.94 -1.76 23.04
4.00 41.88 47.01 -5.13 2.05
5.00 34.35 43.57 -9.22 7.08
6.00 36.58 37.75 -1.17 29.09
7.00 35.49 46.20 -10.70 17.14
8.00 50.00 42.06 7.94 210.18
9.00 28.67 45.67 -17.00 108.96
10.00 43.63 55.00 -11.38 23.17
11.00 39.27 57.92 -18.65 146.05
12.00 40.56 58.65 -18.09 132.96
13.00 45.97 38.56 7.41 195.32
14.00 41.97 44.31 -2.33 17.87
15.00 46.12 43.12 3.01 91.58
16.00 39.86 46.87 -7.01 0.20
17.00 54.71 59.75 -5.04 2.31
18.00 40.55 43.28 -2.73 14.66
19.00 45.78 24.10 21.68 797.62
20.00 23.86 50.53 -26.67 404.15
21.00 38.13 60.20 -22.08 240.66
22.00 48.78 29.40 19.38 673.02
23.00 29.91 48.65 -18.75 148.48
24.00 29.68 64.77 -35.09 814.10
25.00 56.07 34.43 21.64 795.37
26.00 42.59 59.56 -16.96 108.21
27.00 38.98 54.10 -15.12 73.30
28.00 47.54 60.41 -12.87 39.79
29.00 41.54 45.40 -3.86 7.31
30.00 33.70 55.03 -21.33 218.17
Averages: 41.57 48.14 SUM= 5526.77
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -11.71 -1.41  
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Blue.USAFEUROPE.USAF_CAOC#1.F15_SEADSqdn#5.F15E#1.AC_Elint
Run # No Effects Weather Only Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 46.77 54.74 -7.97 1.56 90.91 9.55
2.00 64.10 31.13 32.98 987.14
3.00 40.17 34.85 5.33 14.17
4.00 41.88 29.52 12.36 116.54
5.00 34.35 36.39 -2.04 12.94
6.00 36.58 44.68 -8.09 93.17
7.00 35.49 28.55 6.94 28.94
8.00 50.00 54.81 -4.81 40.56
9.00 28.67 58.93 -30.27 1013.00
10.00 43.63 43.63 1769.75
11.00 39.27 58.70 -19.43 440.49
12.00 40.56 34.65 5.91 18.92
13.00 45.97 33.69 12.28 114.99
14.00 41.97 40.11 1.86 0.09
15.00 46.12 42.60 3.52 3.85
16.00 39.86 32.44 7.42 34.33
17.00 54.71 49.73 4.98 11.68
18.00 40.55 31.88 8.67 50.55
19.00 45.78 32.63 13.14 134.11
20.00 23.86 32.04 -8.18 94.87
21.00 38.13 38.13 1337.15
22.00 48.78 23.71 25.07 552.85
23.00 29.91 37.02 -7.12 75.30
24.00 29.68 32.37 -2.70 18.12
25.00 56.07 43.99 12.08 110.57
26.00 42.59 42.65 -0.06 2.61
27.00 38.98 55.51 -16.53 327.34
28.00 47.54 24.46 23.08 463.16
29.00 41.54 52.30 -10.76 151.90
30.00 33.70 46.28 -12.58 200.09
Averages: 41.57 40.01 SUM= 8310.10
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -4.75 7.87  
 
Average Detection Distances for All Four Cases
Blue.USAFEUROPE.USAF_CAOC#1.F15_SEADSqdn#5.F15E#4.AC_Elint
Run # No Effects Full Effects Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 46.23 22.42 23.81 0.38 549.35 17.72
2.00 65.23 65.23 4206.54
3.00 34.06 42.73 -8.67 81.86
4.00 42.41 45.56 -3.15 12.40
5.00 62.20 31.56 30.64 915.90
6.00 32.40 45.16 -12.77 172.70
7.00 37.54 44.63 -7.10 55.85
8.00 36.39 22.04 14.35 195.21
9.00 51.28 -51.28 2668.03
10.00 36.39 56.06 -19.68 402.09
11.00 39.41 36.67 2.74 5.58
12.00 41.40 50.33 -8.93 86.55
13.00 38.46 42.07 -3.61 15.87
14.00 34.35 34.82 -0.47 0.72
15.00 38.95 47.50 -8.56 79.80
16.00 28.42 35.99 -7.57 63.12
17.00 38.77 28.08 10.69 106.43
18.00 41.57 42.12 -0.55 0.86
19.00 40.44 52.84 -12.40 163.16
20.00 26.38 39.72 -13.34 188.06
21.00 54.48 31.24 23.25 523.17
22.00 37.36 47.13 -9.78 103.07
23.00 45.03 47.13 -2.10 6.11
24.00 30.52 35.83 -5.31 32.31
25.00 48.08 53.02 -4.94 28.21
26.00 42.39 49.30 -6.91 53.12
27.00 46.39 46.39 2117.17
28.00 51.39 33.65 17.73 301.27
29.00 48.07 48.07 2275.08
30.00 34.84 37.79 -2.95 11.06
Averages: 41.36 40.99 SUM= 15420.66
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -8.22 8.97  
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Blue.USAFEUROPE.USAF_CAOC#1.F15_SEADSqdn#5.F15E#4.AC_Elint
Run # No Effects Terrain Only Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 46.23 50.32 -4.09 -2.15 3.79 9.53
2.00 65.23 32.08 33.15 1246.02
3.00 34.06 40.60 -6.54 19.35
4.00 42.41 50.68 -8.27 37.47
5.00 62.20 25.27 36.92 1526.46
6.00 32.40 34.43 -2.03 0.01
7.00 37.54 46.48 -8.95 46.24
8.00 36.39 36.61 -0.23 3.69
9.00 39.43 -39.43 1389.93
10.00 36.39 45.36 -8.97 46.64
11.00 39.41 46.73 -7.32 26.77
12.00 41.40 42.05 -0.65 2.25
13.00 38.46 37.90 0.56 7.32
14.00 34.35 35.65 -1.30 0.71
15.00 38.95 22.97 15.98 328.45
16.00 28.42 62.44 -34.01 1015.64
17.00 38.77 53.61 -14.84 161.09
18.00 41.57 49.38 -7.81 32.08
19.00 40.44 42.96 -2.52 0.14
20.00 26.38 50.90 -24.52 500.73
21.00 54.48 64.66 -10.17 64.46
22.00 37.36 25.87 11.49 185.93
23.00 45.03 46.42 -1.38 0.58
24.00 30.52 64.25 -33.73 997.49
25.00 48.08 34.43 13.65 249.54
26.00 42.39 40.03 2.36 20.30
27.00 46.39 31.44 14.95 292.18
28.00 51.39 61.31 -9.92 60.42
29.00 48.07 49.16 -1.09 1.12
30.00 34.84 41.86 -7.02 23.76
Averages: 41.36 43.51 SUM= 8290.56
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -8.45 4.16  
 
Blue.USAFEUROPE.USAF_CAOC#1.F15_SEADSqdn#5.F15E#4.AC_Elint
Run # No Effects Weather Only Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 46.23 34.60 11.63 3.07 73.29 8.35
2.00 65.23 25.63 39.61 1335.09
3.00 34.06 45.47 -11.41 209.51
4.00 42.41 39.61 2.81 0.07
5.00 62.20 32.21 29.99 724.54
6.00 32.40 42.39 -9.99 170.57
7.00 37.54 36.92 0.62 6.00
8.00 36.39 50.14 -13.76 283.17
9.00 26.06 -26.06 848.60
10.00 36.39 19.27 17.12 197.35
11.00 39.41 51.61 -12.20 233.00
12.00 41.40 43.33 -1.93 24.96
13.00 38.46 21.89 16.57 182.43
14.00 34.35 48.10 -13.75 282.94
15.00 38.95 40.86 -1.92 24.87
16.00 28.42 16.35 12.07 81.04
17.00 38.77 51.08 -12.31 236.35
18.00 41.57 28.27 13.30 104.63
19.00 40.44 33.93 6.52 11.89
20.00 26.38 39.12 -12.73 249.72
21.00 54.48 36.86 17.62 211.77
22.00 37.36 19.70 17.66 212.88
23.00 45.03 61.53 -16.50 382.73
24.00 30.52 38.13 -7.61 113.98
25.00 48.08 43.18 4.90 3.37
26.00 42.39 37.12 5.27 4.85
27.00 46.39 55.81 -9.42 156.04
28.00 51.39 25.43 25.95 523.74
29.00 48.07 58.84 -10.76 191.33
30.00 34.84 45.44 -10.60 186.87
Averages: 41.36 38.30 SUM= 7267.57
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -2.83 8.97  
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Average Detection Distances for All Four Cases
Average Detection Distance Comparisons for All 6 F-15 AC_Elint Sensors
Run # No Effects Full Effects Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 43.53 22.10 21.43 0.49 438.52 3.61
2.00 63.81 59.08 4.73 17.94
3.00 41.06 43.33 -2.27 7.64
4.00 39.42 47.31 -7.90 70.43
5.00 46.21 29.97 16.24 247.96
6.00 44.24 34.32 9.92 88.86
7.00 31.87 46.45 -14.57 226.98
8.00 44.49 30.45 14.04 183.45
9.00 32.29 41.10 -8.82 86.66
10.00 44.65 57.24 -12.59 171.13
11.00 42.24 38.77 3.47 8.86
12.00 34.41 37.65 -3.24 13.95
13.00 46.36 40.86 5.49 24.99
14.00 36.34 35.20 1.15 0.43
15.00 41.15 51.65 -10.50 120.85
16.00 36.34 37.51 -1.17 2.76
17.00 42.72 27.93 14.79 204.45
18.00 39.41 38.44 0.97 0.23
19.00 41.99 48.09 -6.10 43.52
20.00 33.66 36.21 -2.56 9.32
21.00 40.04 34.24 5.80 28.17
22.00 36.55 43.54 -6.99 56.00
23.00 42.88 45.46 -2.58 9.43
24.00 33.02 29.42 3.60 9.63
25.00 50.11 42.90 7.21 45.08
26.00 45.27 53.95 -8.68 84.16
27.00 46.76 43.97 2.79 5.28
28.00 49.53 28.34 21.18 428.02
29.00 43.87 62.21 -18.35 354.98
30.00 33.35 45.05 -11.70 148.63
Averages: 41.58 41.09 SUM= 3138.30
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -3.39 4.37  
 
Average Detection Distance Comparisons for All 6 F-15 AC_Elint Sensors
Run # No Effects Terrain Only Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 43.53 42.10 1.43 -3.07 20.24 3.80
2.00 63.81 44.42 19.40 504.82
3.00 41.06 41.08 -0.02 9.33
4.00 39.42 46.14 -6.73 13.38
5.00 46.21 35.40 10.80 192.46
6.00 44.24 41.23 3.01 37.00
7.00 31.87 45.87 -14.00 119.45
8.00 44.49 37.67 6.82 97.78
9.00 32.29 47.27 -14.98 141.89
10.00 44.65 47.15 -2.50 0.33
11.00 42.24 42.81 -0.56 6.28
12.00 34.41 46.91 -12.50 89.00
13.00 46.36 38.38 7.98 122.11
14.00 36.34 42.05 -5.71 6.98
15.00 41.15 40.93 0.22 10.83
16.00 36.34 48.32 -11.98 79.30
17.00 42.72 53.66 -10.94 61.95
18.00 39.41 45.91 -6.50 11.75
19.00 41.99 34.44 7.55 112.80
20.00 33.66 51.87 -18.21 229.29
21.00 40.04 50.13 -10.09 49.23
22.00 36.55 28.03 8.51 134.18
23.00 42.88 48.82 -5.94 8.24
24.00 33.02 59.99 -26.98 571.61
25.00 50.11 37.32 12.79 251.43
26.00 45.27 47.18 -1.91 1.34
27.00 46.76 36.96 9.80 165.68
28.00 49.53 61.48 -11.96 78.99
29.00 43.87 46.28 -2.41 0.44
30.00 33.35 49.85 -16.50 180.37
Averages: 41.58 44.66 SUM= 3308.47
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -7.05 0.91  
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Average Detection Distance Comparisons for All 6 F-15 AC_Elint Sensors
Run # No Effects Weather Only Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 43.53 41.42 2.11 0.62 2.21 3.13
2.00 63.81 37.87 25.95 641.35
3.00 41.06 39.02 2.04 2.00
4.00 39.42 37.25 2.17 2.39
5.00 46.21 40.05 6.16 30.65
6.00 44.24 45.92 -1.68 5.33
7.00 31.87 35.69 -3.82 19.75
8.00 44.49 49.57 -5.08 32.53
9.00 32.29 45.19 -12.90 182.97
10.00 44.65 43.00 1.65 1.05
11.00 42.24 54.51 -12.27 166.15
12.00 34.41 43.71 -9.31 98.61
13.00 46.36 24.64 21.71 444.73
14.00 36.34 42.07 -5.73 40.34
15.00 41.15 45.37 -4.23 23.52
16.00 36.34 33.28 3.07 5.97
17.00 42.72 48.20 -5.48 37.31
18.00 39.41 30.76 8.65 64.38
19.00 41.99 37.19 4.80 17.42
20.00 33.66 37.30 -3.64 18.22
21.00 40.04 46.07 -6.03 44.25
22.00 36.55 29.06 7.49 47.11
23.00 42.88 48.66 -5.78 40.96
24.00 33.02 36.97 -3.95 20.93
25.00 50.11 41.94 8.17 56.95
26.00 45.27 43.21 2.06 2.05
27.00 46.76 53.64 -6.88 56.29
28.00 49.53 26.87 22.66 485.50
29.00 43.87 46.97 -3.10 13.86
30.00 33.35 43.43 -10.08 114.53
Averages: 41.58 40.96 SUM= 2719.30
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -2.99 4.23  
 
Average Detection Distances for All Four Cases
Blue.USAFEUROPE.USAF_CAOC#1.JSTARS#1.JSTARS_MTI
Run # No Effects Full Effects Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 71.95 63.47 8.47 0.21 68.30 1.26
2.00 59.44 65.78 -6.35 42.98
3.00 61.11 67.75 -6.64 46.89
4.00 68.71 69.91 -1.20 1.99
5.00 65.08 58.96 6.12 34.91
6.00 57.99 68.72 -10.73 119.68
7.00 59.36 60.55 -1.19 1.96
8.00 60.93 60.40 0.53 0.10
9.00 62.85 65.42 -2.57 7.73
10.00 59.76 63.81 -4.05 18.16
11.00 68.20 59.07 9.14 79.67
12.00 59.18 55.62 3.56 11.25
13.00 66.24 64.53 1.71 2.26
14.00 66.01 60.74 5.27 25.65
15.00 68.69 58.69 10.01 95.97
16.00 70.86 68.06 2.80 6.72
17.00 62.49 76.11 -13.63 191.39
18.00 59.36 64.91 -5.56 33.28
19.00 70.36 56.48 13.88 186.86
20.00 67.95 66.57 1.38 1.38
21.00 66.59 61.42 5.17 24.62
22.00 62.84 65.41 -2.57 7.72
23.00 59.04 66.62 -7.58 60.60
24.00 64.08 65.43 -1.34 2.41
25.00 65.82 62.02 3.79 12.83
26.00 70.29 70.15 0.14 0.00
27.00 66.36 64.64 1.72 2.29
28.00 60.89 63.77 -2.89 9.58
29.00 61.04 60.72 0.32 0.01
30.00 58.02 59.47 -1.46 2.78
Averages: 64.05 63.84 SUM= 1099.98
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -2.09 2.51  
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Blue.USAFEUROPE.USAF_CAOC#1.JSTARS#1.JSTARS_MTI
Run # No Effects Terrain Only Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 71.95 59.78 12.17 0.28 141.18 1.83
2.00 59.44 68.11 -8.67 80.17
3.00 61.11 64.68 -3.57 14.87
4.00 68.71 63.60 5.11 23.28
5.00 65.08 69.10 -4.02 18.54
6.00 57.99 72.78 -14.80 227.45
7.00 59.36 62.09 -2.74 9.12
8.00 60.93 73.28 -12.36 159.74
9.00 62.85 52.48 10.37 101.66
10.00 59.76 68.18 -8.42 75.72
11.00 68.20 66.29 1.91 2.65
12.00 59.18 57.64 1.54 1.58
13.00 66.24 61.96 4.29 16.03
14.00 66.01 55.42 10.59 106.30
15.00 68.69 61.88 6.82 42.67
16.00 70.86 58.69 12.17 141.29
17.00 62.49 59.51 2.98 7.26
18.00 59.36 60.88 -1.52 3.26
19.00 70.36 67.00 3.36 9.49
20.00 67.95 63.25 4.70 19.47
21.00 66.59 65.69 0.90 0.38
22.00 62.84 57.95 4.89 21.22
23.00 59.04 66.87 -7.83 65.82
24.00 64.08 66.53 -2.44 7.43
25.00 65.82 61.46 4.36 16.57
26.00 70.29 61.85 8.44 66.48
27.00 66.36 68.70 -2.34 6.88
28.00 60.89 74.46 -13.57 191.92
29.00 61.04 64.54 -3.49 14.27
30.00 58.02 58.32 -0.30 0.34
Averages: 64.05 63.77 SUM= 1593.04
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -2.48 3.05  
 
Blue.USAFEUROPE.USAF_CAOC#1.JSTARS#1.JSTARS_MTI
Run # No Effects Weather Only Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 71.95 59.63 12.31 -0.63 167.52 1.41
2.00 59.44 56.90 2.53 10.02
3.00 61.11 60.79 0.32 0.90
4.00 68.71 70.36 -1.65 1.03
5.00 65.08 60.69 4.38 25.16
6.00 57.99 54.20 3.79 19.51
7.00 59.36 77.92 -18.56 321.58
8.00 60.93 63.71 -2.78 4.62
9.00 62.85 60.51 2.34 8.84
10.00 59.76 64.74 -4.98 18.94
11.00 68.20 74.00 -5.79 26.66
12.00 59.18 56.62 2.56 10.17
13.00 66.24 64.49 1.75 5.68
14.00 66.01 67.42 -1.40 0.60
15.00 68.69 69.98 -1.28 0.43
16.00 70.86 59.89 10.97 134.58
17.00 62.49 67.41 -4.92 18.39
18.00 59.36 70.41 -11.06 108.74
19.00 70.36 72.20 -1.84 1.45
20.00 67.95 57.87 10.08 114.75
21.00 66.59 67.80 -1.21 0.34
22.00 62.84 59.19 3.64 18.29
23.00 59.04 63.21 -4.17 12.50
24.00 64.08 67.66 -3.58 8.69
25.00 65.82 78.69 -12.88 149.92
26.00 70.29 72.32 -2.03 1.95
27.00 66.36 65.68 0.69 1.73
28.00 60.89 63.37 -2.48 3.41
29.00 61.04 57.89 3.15 14.29
30.00 58.02 54.86 3.16 14.36
Averages: 64.05 64.68 SUM= 1225.04
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -3.05 1.79  
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Average Detection Distances for All Four Cases
Blue.USAFEUROPE.USAF_CAOC#1.GlobalHawk#2.GH_EO_SAR
Run # No Effects Full Effects Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 24.70 24.67 0.03 -0.06 0.01 0.00
2.00 24.93 25.02 -0.09 0.00
3.00 24.98 25.01 -0.03 0.00
4.00 24.55 24.47 0.08 0.02
5.00 24.67 24.58 0.08 0.02
6.00 24.80 25.12 -0.31 0.06
7.00 24.79 24.93 -0.14 0.01
8.00 24.67 24.95 -0.28 0.05
9.00 24.78 25.10 -0.32 0.06
10.00 24.62 24.74 -0.12 0.00
11.00 24.90 24.21 0.69 0.56
12.00 24.80 24.61 0.19 0.06
13.00 24.69 24.43 0.26 0.10
14.00 24.72 24.96 -0.24 0.03
15.00 24.98 24.92 0.05 0.01
16.00 24.69 24.90 -0.21 0.02
17.00 24.63 24.65 -0.02 0.00
18.00 24.89 24.74 0.15 0.04
19.00 24.57 25.15 -0.58 0.26
20.00 24.61 25.01 -0.40 0.11
21.00 24.96 24.96 0.00 0.00
22.00 24.62 25.03 -0.41 0.12
23.00 24.59 25.09 -0.50 0.19
24.00 24.79 24.67 0.12 0.03
25.00 24.78 24.73 0.06 0.01
26.00 24.79 24.93 -0.14 0.01
27.00 24.66 25.02 -0.36 0.09
28.00 24.81 24.34 0.47 0.29
29.00 24.96 24.50 0.46 0.27
30.00 24.79 25.20 -0.41 0.12
Averages: 24.76 24.82 SUM= 2.59
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -0.18 0.05  
 
Blue.USAFEUROPE.USAF_CAOC#1.GlobalHawk#2.GH_EO_SAR
Run # No Effects Terrain Only Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 24.70 24.83 -0.13 -0.06 0.01 0.00
2.00 24.93 24.77 0.15 0.05
3.00 24.98 24.94 0.04 0.01
4.00 24.55 24.84 -0.29 0.05
5.00 24.67 24.87 -0.20 0.02
6.00 24.80 24.80 0.00 0.00
7.00 24.79 24.89 -0.09 0.00
8.00 24.67 24.77 -0.10 0.00
9.00 24.78 24.88 -0.10 0.00
10.00 24.62 24.64 -0.02 0.00
11.00 24.90 24.78 0.12 0.03
12.00 24.80 24.83 -0.03 0.00
13.00 24.69 24.71 -0.03 0.00
14.00 24.72 24.80 -0.07 0.00
15.00 24.98 24.77 0.21 0.07
16.00 24.69 24.75 -0.06 0.00
17.00 24.63 24.85 -0.22 0.03
18.00 24.89 24.63 0.26 0.10
19.00 24.57 24.90 -0.33 0.07
20.00 24.61 25.08 -0.47 0.17
21.00 24.96 24.95 0.02 0.01
22.00 24.62 24.65 -0.03 0.00
23.00 24.59 24.79 -0.20 0.02
24.00 24.79 24.64 0.15 0.04
25.00 24.78 24.74 0.05 0.01
26.00 24.79 24.85 -0.06 0.00
27.00 24.66 25.04 -0.37 0.10
28.00 24.81 24.77 0.04 0.01
29.00 24.96 24.83 0.13 0.04
30.00 24.79 24.91 -0.11 0.00
Averages: 24.76 24.82 SUM= 0.85
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -0.12 0.00  
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Blue.USAFEUROPE.USAF_CAOC#1.GlobalHawk#2.GH_EO_SAR
Run # No Effects Weather Only Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 24.70 24.55 0.15 0.13 0.00 0.00
2.00 24.93 24.34 0.58 0.20
3.00 24.98 24.60 0.38 0.06
4.00 24.55 24.70 -0.15 0.08
5.00 24.67 24.64 0.02 0.01
6.00 24.80 24.44 0.36 0.05
7.00 24.79 24.20 0.59 0.21
8.00 24.67 25.05 -0.38 0.26
9.00 24.78 24.57 0.21 0.01
10.00 24.62 24.94 -0.32 0.20
11.00 24.90 25.18 -0.28 0.17
12.00 24.80 24.47 0.33 0.04
13.00 24.69 24.37 0.31 0.03
14.00 24.72 24.49 0.23 0.01
15.00 24.98 24.76 0.21 0.01
16.00 24.69 24.70 -0.01 0.02
17.00 24.63 24.70 -0.07 0.04
18.00 24.89 24.95 -0.06 0.04
19.00 24.57 25.08 -0.50 0.40
20.00 24.61 24.76 -0.16 0.08
21.00 24.96 24.33 0.63 0.25
22.00 24.62 24.72 -0.10 0.05
23.00 24.59 24.39 0.21 0.01
24.00 24.79 24.91 -0.12 0.06
25.00 24.78 24.40 0.38 0.06
26.00 24.79 24.27 0.52 0.15
27.00 24.66 24.39 0.27 0.02
28.00 24.81 24.36 0.45 0.10
29.00 24.96 24.51 0.45 0.10
30.00 24.79 25.00 -0.21 0.12
Averages: 24.76 24.63 SUM= 2.86
95% Test Stat: 1.70
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = 0.03 0.23  
 
Kill and Victim Data Analysis
Red SA and Radar Vans Victim Counts - TOTAL per run
Run # No Effects Full Effects Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 21 13 8.00 1.37 64.00 0.68
2.00 24 24 0.00 0.00
3.00 13 24 -11.00 121.00
4.00 24 21 3.00 9.00
5.00 24 23 1.00 1.00
6.00 24 16 8.00 64.00
7.00 24 24 0.00 0.00
8.00 22 24 -2.00 4.00
9.00 22 23 -1.00 1.00
10.00 24 21 3.00 9.00
11.00 24 22 2.00 4.00
12.00 23 17 6.00 36.00
13.00 22 23 -1.00 1.00
14.00 24 20 4.00 16.00
15.00 19 19 0.00 0.00
16.00 24 23 1.00 1.00
17.00 24 22 2.00 4.00
18.00 22 20 2.00 4.00
19.00 20 24 -4.00 16.00
20.00 24 23 1.00 1.00
21.00 22 23 -1.00 1.00
22.00 24 22 2.00 4.00
23.00 22 13 9.00 81.00
24.00 24 24 0.00 0.00
25.00 23 16 7.00 49.00
26.00 21 13 8.00 64.00
27.00 21 21 0.00 0.00
28.00 24 24 0.00 0.00
29.00 16 22 -6.00 36.00
30.00 24 24 0.00 0.00
Averages: 22.30 20.93 SUM= 591.00
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -0.32 3.05  
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Red SA and Radar Vans Victim Counts - TOTAL per run
Run # No Effects Terrain Only Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 21 19 2.00 0.13 4.24 0.44
2.00 24 18 6.00 36.71
3.00 13 24 -11.00 119.70
4.00 24 24 0.00 0.00
5.00 24 22 2.00 4.24
6.00 24 24 0.00 0.00
7.00 24 24 0.00 0.00
8.00 22 22 0.00 0.00
9.00 22 21 1.00 1.12
10.00 24 24 0.00 0.00
11.00 24 24 0.00 0.00
12.00 23 23 0.00 0.00
13.00 22 23 -1.00 0.89
14.00 24 17 7.00 49.83
15.00 19 24 -5.00 24.41
16.00 24 18 6.00 36.71
17.00 24 24 0.00 0.00
18.00 22 24 -2.00 3.77
19.00 20 20 0.00 0.00
20.00 24 21 3.00 9.36
21.00 22 22 0.00 0.00
22.00 24 22 2.00 4.24
23.00 22 23 -1.00 0.89
24.00 24 23 1.00 1.12
25.00 23 22 1.00 1.12
26.00 21 21 0.00 0.00
27.00 21 24 -3.00 8.65
28.00 24 21 3.00 9.36
29.00 16 24 -8.00 63.06
30.00 24 23 1.00 1.12
Averages: 22.30 22.17 SUM= 380.58
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -1.22 1.48  
 
Red SA and Radar Vans Victim Counts - TOTAL per run
Run # No Effects Weather Only Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 21 20 1.00 0.83 1.00 0.70
2.00 24 24 0.00 0.00
3.00 13 24 -11.00 121.00
4.00 24 19 5.00 25.00
5.00 24 24 0.00 0.00
6.00 24 16 8.00 64.00
7.00 24 24 0.00 0.00
8.00 22 21 1.00 1.00
9.00 22 24 -2.00 4.00
10.00 24 19 5.00 25.00
11.00 24 24 0.00 0.00
12.00 23 21 2.00 4.00
13.00 22 19 3.00 9.00
14.00 24 16 8.00 64.00
15.00 19 20 -1.00 1.00
16.00 24 23 1.00 1.00
17.00 24 23 1.00 1.00
18.00 22 24 -2.00 4.00
19.00 20 24 -4.00 16.00
20.00 24 18 6.00 36.00
21.00 22 24 -2.00 4.00
22.00 24 22 2.00 4.00
23.00 22 21 1.00 1.00
24.00 24 11 13.00 169.00
25.00 23 24 -1.00 1.00
26.00 21 24 -3.00 9.00
27.00 21 23 -2.00 4.00
28.00 24 22 2.00 4.00
29.00 16 22 -6.00 36.00
30.00 24 24 0.00 0.00
Averages: 22.30 21.47 SUM= 609.00
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -0.88 2.54  
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Kill and Victim Data Analysis
Brown Houses Victim Counts - TOTAL per run
Run # No Effects Full Effects Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 8 5 3.00 -2.20 9.00 1.08
2.00 10 9 1.00 1.00
3.00 6 11 -5.00 25.00
4.00 2 8 -6.00 36.00
5.00 7 9 -2.00 4.00
6.00 7 4 3.00 9.00
7.00 6 7 -1.00 1.00
8.00 8 8 0.00 0.00
9.00 7 4 3.00 9.00
10.00 6 8 -2.00 4.00
11.00 8 7 1.00 1.00
12.00 10 7 3.00 9.00
13.00 8 7 1.00 1.00
14.00 4 7 -3.00 9.00
15.00 2 8 -6.00 36.00
16.00 7 6 1.00 1.00
17.00 1 3 -2.00 4.00
18.00 9 7 2.00 4.00
19.00 4 6 -2.00 4.00
20.00 7 8 -1.00 1.00
21.00 8 10 -2.00 4.00
22.00 7 7 0.00 0.00
23.00 7 8 -1.00 1.00
24.00 6 7 -1.00 1.00
25.00 6 5 1.00 1.00
26.00 0.00 6 -6.00 36.00
27.00 0.00 9 -9.00 81.00
28.00 0.00 5 -5.00 25.00
29.00 0.00 7 -7.00 49.00
30.00 0.00 24 -24.00 576.00
Averages: 5.37 7.57 SUM= 942.00
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -4.33 -0.07  
 
Brown Houses Victim Counts - TOTAL per run
Run # No Effects Terrain Only Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 8 5 3.00 -0.40 9.36 0.29
2.00 10 7 3.00 9.36
3.00 6 7 -1.00 0.89
4.00 2 10 -8.00 63.06
5.00 7 4 3.00 9.36
6.00 7 7 0.00 0.00
7.00 6 6 0.00 0.00
8.00 8 8 0.00 0.00
9.00 7 7 0.00 0.00
10.00 6 7 -1.00 0.89
11.00 8 5 3.00 9.36
12.00 10 6 4.00 16.48
13.00 8 9 -1.00 0.89
14.00 4 7 -3.00 8.65
15.00 2 5 -3.00 8.65
16.00 7 7 0.00 0.00
17.00 1 5 -4.00 15.53
18.00 9 11 -2.00 3.77
19.00 4 8 -4.00 15.53
20.00 7 7 0.00 0.00
21.00 8 5 3.00 9.36
22.00 7 3 4.00 16.48
23.00 7 5 2.00 4.24
24.00 6 5 1.00 1.12
25.00 6 6 0.00 0.00
26.00 0.00 3 -3.00 8.65
27.00 0.00 2 -2.00 3.77
28.00 0.00 6 -6.00 35.30
29.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
30.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
Averages: 5.37 5.77 SUM= 250.69
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -1.50 0.70  
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Brown Houses Victim Counts - TOTAL per run
Run # No Effects Weather Only Z Z bar (Z-Z bar)^2 Var(Z bar)
1.00 8 5 3.00 -0.43 9.00 0.41
2.00 10 8 2.00 4.00
3.00 6 6 0.00 0.00
4.00 2 8 -6.00 36.00
5.00 7 9 -2.00 4.00
6.00 7 4 3.00 9.00
7.00 6 7 -1.00 1.00
8.00 8 3 5.00 25.00
9.00 7 7 0.00 0.00
10.00 6 6 0.00 0.00
11.00 8 8 0.00 0.00
12.00 10 6 4.00 16.00
13.00 8 8 0.00 0.00
14.00 4 6 -2.00 4.00
15.00 2 7 -5.00 25.00
16.00 7 11 -4.00 16.00
17.00 1 9 -8.00 64.00
18.00 9 7 2.00 4.00
19.00 4 7 -3.00 9.00
20.00 7 6 1.00 1.00
21.00 8 1 7.00 49.00
22.00 7 5 2.00 4.00
23.00 7 5 2.00 4.00
24.00 6 6 0.00 0.00
25.00 6 7 -1.00 1.00
26.00 0.00 5 -5.00 25.00
27.00 0.00 7 -7.00 49.00
28.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
29.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
30.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
Averages: 5.37 5.80 SUM= 359.00
95% Test Stat: 2.04
Lower Limit Upper Limit
Confidence Interval: W bar +/- Test Stat*SQRT(Var(W Bar)) = -1.75 0.88  
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